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ABSTRACT 
 
Emerging research suggests that property rights play a significant role in the economic 
and social development of nations. To test this proposition, this study examines the case of 
Jamaica and whether there is a relationship between property rights and development.  In 
order to carry out this investigation, this study gathers and analyzes existing research to: 
1. define the extent that Jamaicans lack property rights and how this affects their 
everyday quality of life and vulnerability to poverty; 
2. examine the relationship between the absence of property rights and 
underdevelopment; and 
3. explore how the current international and local Jamaican policy environment is 
positioned to address an absence of property rights. 
 
This research confirms that there is a significant proportion of Jamaicans who do not 
have access to property rights, that this is related to social and economic underdevelopment, 
and that the international and local policy environment does not sufficiently address the 
absence of property rights. As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica, development approaches 
and Government of Jamaica policy may need to be adjusted to include property rights. 
This research involves four stages. Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature 
related to the study of property rights and development. Chapter Three estimates the extent of 
the absence of property rights in Jamaica and elaborates how this affects everyday quality of 
life regarding housing, work, security, and public infrastructure. Chapter Four explores the 
connection between Jamaica’s lack of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five 
examines the international and local policy environment to better understand the official 
response to the absence of property rights. Finally, the research concludes with policy 
recommendations for the Government of Jamaica, to establish a task force charged with 
property rights reform, to transform the political patronage system, and to creatively seek 
resources, funding and partnerships from donor nations and organizations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Rationale and Research Question 
Emerging research suggests that property rights play a significant role in the economic and 
social development of nations. To test this proposition, this study examines the case of Jamaica and 
whether there is a relationship between property rights and development.  In order to carry out this 
investigation, this study conducts research in three stages by: 
1. defining the extent that Jamaicans lack property rights and how this affects their everyday 
quality of life and vulnerability to poverty; 
2. examining the relationship between the absence of property rights and underdevelopment; 
and 
3. exploring how the current international and local Jamaican policy environment is positioned 
to address an absence of property rights. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
I was fortunate to reside in Jamaica recently for two years as a development worker, living 
alongside the poorest of Jamaica’s population. What I found troubling was that most of the 
Jamaicans I knew existed outside of the legal system. They did not have land titles or legal business 
licensing. Most did not receive workplace benefits or labor protection. They were unable to access 
capital or loans because they do not own legal, formal security to be used for collateral. The illegal 
taxi cab drivers that my community relied on frequently bribed police officers in order to avoid jail 
and confiscation of their vehicles. Untaxed and unregulated street vendors risked being fined and 
their goods confiscated. Many Jamaicans whose homes were built in illegal squatter communities 
lived under the daily possibility of eviction or bulldozing.  
To become legal required more money and resources than they had. It appeared to me that 
Jamaicans had no choice but to work, live and conduct their daily affairs in the black market 
economy. I couldn’t understand why no apparent attention was being given to the issue by the 
government or by development agencies. I found that a rich assortment of field work, surveys and 
research have focused on individual issues typically assumed to be caused by poverty or culture. For 
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example, there are excellent studies exist on the issue of Jamaica’s informal street vending, illegal 
transportation, or squatters. Distinct from those studies, this research is the first to treat these issues 
as pieces belonging to a larger puzzle, framing them under the overarching issue of property rights. 
In the context of Jamaica, this research is the first in its field. 
This research confirms that there is a significant proportion of Jamaicans who do not have 
access to property rights, that this is related to social and economic underdevelopment, and that the 
international and local policy environment does not sufficiently address the absence of property 
rights. Based on this research it is reasonable to conclude that there exists a serious policy oversight 
by international donors and the Government of Jamaica. For decades, Western international 
governance bodies such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO have steered developing nations like 
Jamaica to implement market liberalization and democratization; however without the underlying 
foundation of property rights these reforms may result in damaging unintended consequences rather 
than hoped-for development. As Thomas Friedman argues in his recent bestselling books on 
globalization, implementing free market capitalism without strong institutions is the equivalent of 
purchasing new computer hardware without software.1 As demonstrated by the case of Jamaica, 
development approaches and western advice may need to be adjusted to include property rights. 
 
Methodology 
The research design is constructed as a focused case study. Case studies are the preferred 
method when how and why questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. 2 This 
study explores the sequence and structure of events and the testimony of actors to explain the 
                                                          
1 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 1999),151; Ibid, The World is Flat 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 309-336. 
2 Robert Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). 
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relationship between property rights and underdevelopment. Jamaica’s historical record will serve as 
the data. The research incorporates secondary data such as interviews and surveys collected by field 
research professionals. The research also relies on existing sociological, anthropological, and 
economic analyses in academic journals, books, and occasional papers, and committee reports. Many 
of the sources are from the Government of Jamaica and multilateral development institutions. The 
research incorporates accounts from daily newspapers such as the Jamaica Gleaner, as well as the 
speech and writings of policy actors and everyday Jamaicans. In addition, my familiarity with 
Jamaican culture and the daily reality of hardships faced by Jamaicans helped in understanding the 
significance and context of the findings. 
Because the study of property rights as an institutional problem is a relatively new field, 
development scholars have emphasized the need for country-specific case studies. “Country case 
studies show important links between good governance institutions and economic success, but they 
also highlight special features of each countries. The work of distilling general insights that are likely 
to remain valid for other countries is only just beginning.”3  
This research involves four stages. Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature 
related to the study of property rights and development. Chapter Three estimates the extent of the 
absence of property rights in Jamaica and elaborates how this affects everyday quality of life 
regarding housing, work, security, and public infrastructure. Chapter Four explores the connection 
between Jamaica’s lack of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five examines the 
international and local policy environment to better understand the official response to the absence 
of property rights. Finally, the research concludes with recommendations for Government of 
Jamaica policy makers. 
 
                                                          
3 Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 150. 
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Case Selection and Significance of the Research 
Typical of Anglophone Caribbean nations, Jamaica’s transition from a British colonial slave-
holding nation to a modern, democratic capitalist economy has not been easy. Although an 
independent nation for 40 years, having been labeled a showcase World Bank and IMF client, and 
despite implementation of market liberalization and democratic reforms, Jamaica continues to 
struggle to overcome an inherited legacy of underdevelopment.   
Jamaica is typical of Caribbean island economies that struggle as small closed markets with 
historical low growth rates and endemic unemployment. Jamaica’s current unemployment rate is 15 
percent, and 25 percent of Jamaicans live below the poverty line.4 In certain urban areas, the 
unemployment rate can be as high as 80 percent.5 Jamaican regulators have been skeptical of 
technology and innovation due to its adverse impact on jobs, resulting in Jamaica’s industries 
becoming less competitive, and falling further behind in industrializing. And as for solutions, there is 
not yet a consensus on models for Caribbean development.6 The 2004 CIA World Factbook 
summarizes Jamaica’s economic outlook as bleak: 
Jamaica’s economy faces serious long-term problems: high interest rates; increased 
foreign competition; a pressured, sometimes sliding, exchange rate; a sizable 
merchandise trade deficit; large-scale unemployment; and a growing internal debt, the 
result of government bailouts to ailing sectors of the economy. The ratio of debt to 
GDP is close to 150%. Inflation, previously a bright spot, is expected to remain in the 
double digits. Uncertain economic conditions have led to increased civil unrest, 
including gang violence fueled by the drug trade. In 2004, the government faced the 
difficult prospect of having to achieve fiscal discipline in order to maintain debt 
payments while simultaneously attacking a serious and growing crime problem which is 
hampering economic growth.7  
 
Despite these disadvantages, it seems possible for Jamaica to become strategically positioned 
for economic development and global competition. The 2005 UNDP Human Development Report 
                                                          
4 Mark Wenner, Microenterprise Development in Jamaica: Preliminary Assessment (Washington DC: IADB, 1996). 
5 United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States – 
Jamaica, West Indies (Washington, DC: International Trade Administration, 1986). 
6 Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (The University Press of Florida: Gainesville, FL, 2001). 
7 CIA World Factbook, (Washington DC, 2004). 
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ranks Jamaica as an MDC, or Middle Developing Country, as opposed to a Lower Developing 
Country. Jamaica possesses natural resources such as one of the world’s largest natural harbors, the 
largest English-speaking population south of Miami, year-round tourism, bauxite, the key mineral to 
manufacture aluminum, and close proximity to the American and Canadian consumer markets. 
Additionally, Jamaica’s banking sector is relatively well developed.8   
And yet is Jamaica luring foreign direct investment? According to the United Nations 2002 
World Investment Report, out of 140 countries, Jamaica is ranked 79th on the FDI (foreign direct 
investment) potential index, far behind Singapore and Taiwan.9  India is establishing English-
language call centers and medical transcription services while Jamaica, a naturally English-speaking 
country, lags behind.  Although Jamaica had a higher per capita GDP in the 1960s than did 
Singapore and South Korea, that is far from the reality today.10  
This research examines whether the absence of property rights in Jamaica contributes to our 
understanding of such underdevelopment. The results have implications for Government of Jamaica 
policy, as well as multilateral and bilateral development policy, distribution of assistance and 
interventions. The Washington consensus ideology that dominates development policy may need to 
include necessary pre-conditions, such as property rights. Property rights have also become of 
interest to policy makers and researchers in security studies. Military strategists are recognizing that 
black markets provide the support and infrastructure for criminal and terrorist activities.11 Theories 
and models that can shape policy to combat informal economies will be received with interest. 
                                                          
8Mitchell, Harold, Politics and Economics in the Caribbean (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1968), 326. 
9 United Nations, World Investment Report (Washington, D.C.: 2002), 25. 
10 Donald Allen and Michelle Gyles, “Trade, Growth and Capital: A Case Study of Jamaica,” (St. Louis: working 
paper for the St. Louis Federal Reserve, 1995). 
11 Geoffrey Demarest, Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy (Washington, DC: 
military strategy paper for the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review is not intended to be an exhaustive review of existing research on property 
rights. Rather, it provides an overview of emerging knowledge regarding three key issues:  
I. Definition of property rights and the informal economy 
II. The difficulty of measuring property rights 
III. The relationship between property rights and economic development 
 
I. Property Rights: Definition and Key Concepts  
Property refers to the ownership of an asset or possession. There are different types of 
property. Real property is immovable and typically of high value, such as one’s home, land, or 
commercial real estate. Commercial property might include inventory or business equipment such 
as machinery. Moveable personal property may include furniture. An example of intangible 
property would be the value of one’s own labor and capacity to work. Intellectual property is a 
creation of the intellect that has value, for example artistic creations or business methods.  
Property rights are referred to as a bundle of legal rights because there are multiple rights to 
one’s assets.12 These rights includes the right to use the property as one sees fit (subject to certain 
restrictions, such as zoning), the right to exclude others from using it,  and the right to rent, transfer 
or sell it.  
Property rights are different from mere possession in that a claim “will be enforced by 
society or the state, by customs or convention or law.”13 Government institutions are integral to the 
definition and enforcement of property rights through the court system and police enforcement. As 
individuals compete for resources, an enforced property rights system provides externally imposed 
rules, laws or ordinances that minimize conflict over resources. This is not so for developing nations 
with weak institutions and limited resources. “If property rights are not well defined and enforced, 
                                                          
12 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House, 1999); Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney,  
Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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the incentive to take by threat or violence increases, with the predictable results that resource owners 
will invest less in developing their property or even keeping it up.”14 
Property rights may exist in theory or may be written in constitutions, but may not be 
enforced, clearly defined, or accessible to the majority of the population. The driving focus behind 
this research is to gain an understanding of the widespread absence of property rights common in 
developing nations, how it affects people, and what governments can do about it. 
 
II. The Difficulty of Measuring Property Rights 
Where property rights are absent, the very nature of an illegal, unrecorded shadow economy 
makes it difficult to quantify and measure. Some compare it to speculating about the dark side of the 
moon. Institutions such as the Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center and 
United Nations Development Programme are currently in the process of developing metrics and 
indicators for property rights; however they are not yet available.   
There are many obstacles to measuring the informal economy. There is overlap and cross-
over between formal and informal sectors, such as when formal businesses engage in informal 
activities like paying employees under the table.  
Data collection techniques such as surveys or direct interviews are problematic. Subjects are 
reluctant to voluntarily discuss their illegal activities such as living on captured land or running an 
unregistered business. People are not likely to candidly report untaxed personal income.  Tax 
auditing methods used to measure the discrepancy between declared taxable income and actual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House, 1999), xv. 
14 Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney, Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 6. 
Page 8 of 85 
  
   
 
income also have inherent weaknesses. Tax auditing methods are likely to be biased because audits 
are typically selected upon suspicion of fraud.15 
Given such empirical murkiness, researchers have designed creative techniques to measure 
property rights. Economist Hernando de Soto’s research team investigated regulations and measured 
the costs and barriers for the everyday person in Peru to access property rights. They set up a 
fictitious clothing factory in Peru and went through the procedure of establishing it legally. The 
findings were published in The Other Path, which is recognized as the classic study of property rights. 
The research team found that it took 289 days to register the factory and took the full-time labor of 
the group assigned to the task, as well as $1,231 (including expenses and lost wages), the equivalent 
of 32 minimum monthly wages. They researched legal housing and found that it would take six years 
and eleven months to navigate various ministries and municipal offices and cost approximately 56 
times the minimum monthly wage. To get a license to sell goods from a pushcart required 43 days of 
commuting and a cost of 15 times the minimum monthly wage.16 The significance of de Soto’s 
findings is that heavy regulatory burdens on legal business and home ownership make it practically 
impossible for the majority of people in developing nations to access legal property rights. 
Also using creative research methods, researcher James Smith recognized that those 
operating illegally would be reluctant to be interviewed. Smith therefore estimated the size of the 
informal economy in the U.S. by interviewing families about the value and type of purchases they 
made from vendors selling goods and services.17 He was able to estimate that $42 billion in informal 
economic activity took place in 1981 in the U.S., the majority of which were home repairs, food 
sales, childcare and domestic services. 
                                                          
15 Kevin McCrohan, James Smith and T. Adams, “Consumer Purchases in Informal Markets: Estimates for the 
1980s, Prospects for the 1990s,” Journal of Retailing 67 (1991): 22-50; and for a detailed review of measurement 
techniques for informal economies, see Friedrich Schneider,“Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 
110 Countries Around the World” (Washington, D.C.: working paper for the World Bank, 2002). 
16 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper and Row, 
1989), xii. 
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Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer18 developed a property rights index using institutional 
indicators obtained from two private international investment risk services. They utilized the 
variables “expropriation risk” and “rule of law” as proxies for the security of property, “repudiation 
of contracts by government” as an indicator of contract enforcement, “corruption in government” 
and “quality of the bureaucracy” to represent the extend and damage of rent-seeking behavior, as 
well as “contract enforceability” “infrastructure quality” “nationalization potential” and 
“bureaucratic delays.”   
Finally, a commonly used approach used by economists is the currency ratio model.19 This 
model relies upon the likelihood that those who conduct their affairs in the informal sector use 
under the table cash currency either to avoid detection, or because they lack access to checking 
accounts or credit cards. The currency ratio model studies the changes in currency holdings, or the 
ratio of noncurrency money to the total money supply. Using this method, economists conclude that 
an increase in the currency ratio indicates that more business is being transacted outside the 
regulatory framework. 
 
III.  The Relationship Between Property Rights and Economic Development 
When using the term development, this research is referring to both economic and social 
development, typically measured in terms of jobs and income, but it also includes improvements in 
quality of life such as human development, social infrastructure, education, health, choice, and 
environmental sustainability.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 James Smith, “Measuring the Informal Economy,” The Annals of the American Academy (1987): 84-99. 
18 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alterative 
Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 207-227. 
19 Karl Bennett, “Economic Decline and the Growth of the Informal Sector: The Guyana and Jamaican Experience,” 
Journal of International Development 7 (1995): 229-242; P.M. Guttman, “The Subterranean Economy,” Financial 
Analysis Journal 33 (1977): 24-27; Eric Feige, “Momentary Methods of Estimating Informal Activities in 
Developing Countries” in Demographic Change and Economic Development, Alois Wenig and Klaus Zimmermann, 
eds.,  (London: Springer, 1989). 
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Development experts and scholars have only recently recognized the relationship between 
property rights and development. Economist Douglas North pioneered the field of New 
Institutional Economics and linked country characteristics such as the security of property rights 
directly to the prosperity of nations. 20 Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s research and policy 
recommendations on property rights have been implemented in his native Peru and other 
developing nations. 21   
Influenced by North, economist Avanash Dixit studied the problem of property rights and 
development in depth, and concluded: “anticipation of opportunism, theft, or extortion constitutes a 
strong disincentive to make potentially valuable investments or entering into mutually beneficial 
contracts in the first place. Therefore if market economies are to succeed, they need a foundation of 
mechanisms…to sustain adequate incentives to invest, produce and exchange. In other words, 
markets need the underpinning of institutions of economic governance.”22  Economist Norman 
Loayza developed economic growth model formulas to study the effect of the informal economy 
and concluded, “...the relative size of the informal sector is negatively correlated with the rate of 
economic growth.”23   
The 2002 Economic Freedom of the World Index24 reports that between 1990 and 2000, 
nations that scored in the top fifth of the economic freedom rankings had secure property rights. 
Nations that had secure property rights had an average per capita income of US $23,450, with an 
average economic growth rate of 2.6 a year. Nations that scored low on secure property rights had 
                                                          
20 Douglass North, Economics of Public Issues (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); ibid, Understanding the 
Process of Economic Change (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
21 De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 6; Ibid, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1989). 
21 Ibid, xii. 
22 Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 
23 Norman Loayza,“The Economics of the Informal Sector: a Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from 
Latin America,” Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45 (1996), 142. 
Page 11 of 85 
  
   
 
an average per capita income of US $2,560, with an average negative growth rate of 0.9 percent. 
Similarly, the Knack and Keefer property rights index described above revealed a correlation 
between under performing economies and low scores on property rights.25 
 Seth Norton found that secure property rights have a positive relationship to environmental 
quality and human well being, including such factors as safe drinking water, sewage treatment access, 
and life expectancy. He summarized that “…property rights and its related construct, the rule of law, 
and…freedom from property rights attenuation, are all positively related to economic growth. Their 
absence leads to economic stagnation and decline.”26 
 Lack of secure property rights and large informal economies reduce government ability to 
collect taxes to provide public goods, services and infrastructure. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobaton27 found that countries with higher tax revenues have smaller informal economies. 
Nations with large informal economies may be trapped in a dangerous underdevelopment 
cycle. Ybarra conducted a case study of informal businesses in Valencia Spain and found that the 
nature of informalization is self-reinforcing by strengthening “…its own rules: labor conditions 
erode and wages shrink; entrepreneurial efforts center on strategies to conceal clandestine activities 
more and better. This reduces or eliminates incentives for technological progress, innovation, and 
investment.”28  A study of informal economies in 25 countries found quantitative evidence that 
“...once established, the shadow economy is hard to remove.”29 In 2001, seventeen developing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, The Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report (Vancouver: 
Fraser Institute, 2002). 
25 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alterative 
Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 207-227. 
26 Seth Norton, “Property rights, the environment, and economic well-being” in Who Owns the Environment? Peter 
J. Hill and Roger E. Meiners, eds., (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 44. 
27 Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Corruption, Public Finances and the Unofficial 
Economy” (Washington, D.C.: working paper for The World Bank, 1998). 
28 Josep-Antoni Ybarra, “Informationalization in the Valencian economy: A Model for Underdevelopment” in The 
Informal Economy, Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren Benton, eds.,  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989), 224. 
29 Clifford Zinnes and Yair Eliat, “The Shadow Economy in Transition Counties: Friend or Foe? A Policy 
Perspective,” World Development 30 (2002): 1233. 
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countries had seen an actual decline in the security of property rights.30 If an absence of property 
rights exists in a self-perpetuating cycle, then it is of the utmost importance that governments 
recognize the problem. Property rights will not become accessible to the majority of a nation's 
citizens without intervention. 
To conclude, the current literature presented here provides an overview of existing 
scholarship regarding the definition of property rights, strengths and weaknesses of various research 
methods for the measurement of property rights, and evidence of a connection between property 
rights and development. It is upon this foundation of knowledge that we launch our exploration of 
property rights in Jamaica. 
  
                                                          
30 Gerald O’Driscoll, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2001). 
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Figure 2. Informal housing in Old Harbour, Jamaica.  
Photograph by Joe Nagle, 2003. 
CHAPTER 3:  THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN JAMAICA: A PORTRAIT 
   
I. Absence of Property Rights for Housing and Land 
A functioning property rights system for housing and land is often taken for granted in the 
developed West. It provides a legal 
foundation that enables 
unambiguous and secure ownership 
of property, the ability to build equity 
and establish collateral for credit, 
increased likelihood of investment in 
repairs and upgrades, increased 
likelihood to be compliant with 
zoning and environmental 
regulations, more years of education for children, and lower birth rates. 31 The United Nations 
Economic and Social Council strongly affirmed the importance of property rights to enhance 
development:   
No country can sustain stability within its boundaries, or economic development 
within the wider world, unless it has a land rights policy that promotes internal 
confidence among its people, its commercial enterprises, and its government. 
Recognizing that land is a source of wealth lies at the heart of good government and 
effective public administration. States that prosper promote widespread and secured 
private ownership of land as a foundation of social and economic policy.32 
 
                                                          
31 United Nations Economic Commission, “Social and Economic Benefits of Good Land Administration” (working 
paper, 1998); Economic Report of the President, “The Benefits of Land Titles,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing 
Office, 2005);  Gershon Feder and Akihiko Nishio, “The Benefits of Land Registration and Titling: Economic and 
Social Perspectives,” Land Use Policy 15 (1999): 25-43; Louis DeAlessi,“Gains from Private Property: The 
Empirical Evidence” in Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law, Terry L. Anderson and Fred S. 
McChesney, eds., (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky, 
“Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling” (working paper, August 9, 2005). 
32 United Nations Economic Commission, “Social and Economic Benefits of Good Land Administration” (working 
paper, 1998). 
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In marked contrast, in a nation like Jamaica where property rights for housing and land is 
inaccessible to the majority of its population, the government is overwhelmed by problems created 
by widespread informal housing development.  These problems include illegal building, 
environmental degradation, unplanned urban and rural development, squatting, occupation of flood 
prone areas, or inadequate infrastructure such as roads, sewage or utilities.  
As recently as 2002, the Jamaican Ministry of Land and Environment estimated that 50-70 
percent of housing development takes place outside the formal legal system.33 Rapid urbanization 
has particularly amplified mass informal building in Jamaica’s major cities of Kingston and Montego 
Bay. The population of the Kingston metropolitan area increased from 379,980 in 1960 to 868,653 
in 2001, much of which resulted in rapid informal housing development.34 A geographer’s case study 
of the rapid urbanization of Montego Bay concluded that the total population living in newly 
constructed informal shantytowns was 20,100, or 40 percent of the city. The same author’s study of 
Spanish Town found that 36 percent of homes were built informally on captured or rent land.35  
Of Jamaica’s estimated one million parcels of land, 450,000 have been formally registered at 
some point in time; however many of those registered titles are likely to be outdated after sale or 
subdivision. The Jamaican government acknowledges that poor institutional infrastructure is a 
significant cause of the inaccessibility and unaffordablity of land to a large portion of the population, 
particularly low-income households. According to the Ministry of Land and Environment, “…the 
unavailability of legally accessible and affordable land has contributed to the chronic problems of 
                                                          
33 Jacqueline DaCosta, “Integrating Land Issues into the Broader Development Agenda: Case Study Jamaica” (paper 
presented by Ministry of Land and Environment, Jamaica for Regional Workshop on Land Issues in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Pachuca, Mexico, May 19-22, 2002), 6. 
34 Colin Clark and David Howard, “Class, Unemployment and Housing Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since 
Independence,” (working paper, Nd). 
35 Alan Eyre, “The Shantytowns of Montego Bay, Jamaica,” Geographical Review 62 (1972): 394-413; Ibid, “The 
Internal Dynamics of Shanty Towns in Jamaica,” Caribbean Geography 1 (1984): 256-270. 
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squatting and other illegal development on both government and private lands, sometimes under 
severely precarious and environmentally unfriendly conditions.”36   
The Jamaica Gleaner interviewed Glendon Newsome, senior lecturer in the Department of 
Building and Land Management at the University of Technology and vice-president of the Land 
Surveyors Association of Jamaica. Newsome stated that the absence of ownership titles has created 
uncertainty for thousands of Jamaicans. He elaborated: “For a small farmer, registration of a square 
of land - about say one tenth of an acre, can cost as much as the value of land…Fees charged by the 
attorney, land surveyor and titles office vary according to the value of the land. But legal experts 
explained that the cost of acquiring titles has been known to run anywhere from $30,000 to more 
than $100,000 - sometimes costing as much as the value of the land.”37 
High cost therefore is likely to be the reason why so many Jamaicans do not have formal 
property rights to their homes and land. The minimum total cost associated with bringing the 
smallest parcel of land under The Registration of Titles Act (where there is no complexity) is 
approximately US $900 or J$45,000.38  Considering that Jamaica’s GDP per capita is $3,005,39 $900 is 
an impossible figure for the majority of Jamaicans to afford. Few Jamaicans have access to credit or 
mortgages, therefore land registration expenses must be paid up front and out of pocket. Typical 
expenses include the cost to survey the land at a minimum of US $300, transfer taxes, stamp duties 
for property registration regularization, sub-division approval fees, and Natural Resource and 
Conservation Authority permit fees, not to mention additional legal service costs.  
A recent letter to the editor in The Jamaica Gleaner illustrates a citizen’s frustration at delays 
and his distrust of the bureaucracy: 
                                                          
36 Jacqueline DaCosta, “Integrating Land Issues into the Broader Development Agenda: Case Study Jamaica” (paper 
presented at the Regional Workshop on Land Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean, Pachuca, Mexico, May 19-
22, 2002), 16-17. 
37 “Thousands Occupy Lands without Ownership Proof,” Jamaica Gleaner, July 8, 2001. 
38 Jacqueline DaCosta, “Country Experience in Land Issues,” (working paper for USAID, April 23, 2003), 28. 
39 UNDP, Human Development Indicators 2003. 
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THE EDITOR, Sir:  
IT WOULD appear that many attorneys-at-law have a vested interest in an inefficient 
legal system and should the system become reasonably efficient, then many of them 
would be without a job. Attorneys-at-law comprise 20 per cent of the representatives 
in Parliament and if they were really interested in improving the system, they could 
easily do so. Maybe they can earn more money in an inefficient legal system…in the 
area of conveyanc-ing/real estate, a straightforward transfer of land involving a free 
title and a cash purchaser is taking 60 to 90 days to be completed. If the transfer 
entails the purchaser securing a mortgage then we are looking at an average period of 
five months for completion, if you are lucky…The attorneys seem happy and relaxed 
with the situation as it is and conveniently blame the Stamp Commissioner's Office 
and the Titles Office for the lengthy delays…I do not get the impression that the Bar 
Association, attorneys-at-law and financial institutions are even agitating for 
improvements. Is it that they benefit financially from the inefficiencies of these 
organisations? If not, I urge them to petition the relevant authorities for 
improvement in these departments.  
I am, etc.,  
CONCERNED CITIZEN40 
 
Zoning and building codes are too cumbersome and costly to be reasonably observed. 
According to one researcher, a modest house that met the standards of the Kingston Development 
Order would only be affordable to the earners in the top 15 percent bracket. Additionally, the 
process to apply for subdivision required redundant referrals to multiple outside agencies.41 The lack 
of an automated cadastral system and numerous of legal and administrative complexities imply that 
it can take two to three years for a business or household to acquire clear title to a parcel of land it 
wants to develop.42 
Jamaica’s primary system for distributing housing and mortgages is through publicly 
managed government housing schemes. Remarkably, even those who live in government housing 
schemes often lack legal property rights. The Ministry of Land and Environment estimates that as 
many as 50,000 parcels of land in government housing schemes and land settlements do not have 
                                                          
40 “Inefficient legal system,” Jamaica Gleaner, January 23, 2004. 
41 Urban Institute, “Jamaica: The Urban Management Gap” in Urbanization in the Caribbean: Prospects and 
Management Priorities (Washington DC: The Urban Institute, 1990). 
42 Ibid. 
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formally issued land titles. If even the government itself is unable to provide land titles for its own 
properties, one can imagine the likelihood of the average Jamaican acquiring a land title.  
It is not surprising that citizens find creative ways around the system. Economists predict 
that high opportunity costs result in a search for alternative ways to achieve the task at hand. The 
following Jamaica Gleaner article illustrates how most people grease the wheels of the bureaucracy to 
obtain land titles: 
Titles fraud 'could run into billions'  
MASSIVE fraud at the Land Titles Division of the National Land Agency (NLA) 
which may have cost billions of dollars in lost tax revenues is outlined in a report 
now before the Cabinet… “The losses could run into billions," one informed 
Government source told The Sunday Gleaner on condition of anonymity … "The 
slowness and inefficiencies of the system lends itself to corruption because people cut 
corners to get their things done and one thing leads to another."43 
 
In a study of the relationship between class, unemployment, housing and services, the 
researcher searched for correlations between 100 different variables in Jamaica, and concluded that 
“…it seems safe to conclude that poor quality housing in Kingston, involving rental and squatting, is 
rooted in low occupational status (mostly in the informal sector)…”44 This indicates that the same 
people who are living in extra-legal housing are also working in extra-legal employment, discussed in 
the next section. 
 
                                                          
43 “Titles fraud 'could run into billions,’” Jamaica Gleaner, February 24, 2002. 
44 Colin Clarke and David Howard, “Class, Unemployment and Housing Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since 
Independence” (working paper, Nd.), 18. 
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Figure 3. Jamaican Street Vendor.  
Photograph by Joe Nagle, 2003. 
II. Absence of Property Rights Related to Labor and Self-Employment 
In economies where property rights are firmly established, legal rules guide contracts between 
buyers and sellers regarding the purchase, use or 
sale of goods or assets. There are enforceable 
contracts between employers and employees over 
labor laws, wages, health insurance, pensions, and 
safety. There are agreements regarding the 
extension of credit to customers or suppliers and 
legal penalties for failure to pay. Compliance with 
regulations and taxes, and security and protection 
from theft is assumed by most of the population. 
In markets operating under property rights 
systems, if expectations for product quality are not 
met, consumers have confidence that the faulty 
product can be returned for replacement or refund. 
None of the above described rules for 
exchange can be counted on in economies where property rights are lacking, undefined, or not 
enforced. Without property rights, developing nations inevitably contain a small legal formal 
economy counterbalanced by a massive informal economy.  
The informal economy can be used interchangeably with other terms such as invisible, black 
market, parallel, hidden, submerged, shadow, irregular, non-official, unrecorded, or clandestine.45 
Informal economies typically include masses of people employed in low wage and unlicensed work, 
and where a large proportion of unregulated businesses operate with cash transactions under the 
                                                          
45 Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center Glossary (University of Maryland, Nd). 
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level of taxing and regulatory monitoring and with undefined liability. Where “…rights to these 
possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, 
cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be 
used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment.”46   
When individuals operate outside the legal, formal economy, they typically do not have access to 
the protection of their property, which in this case is their labor. They lack social protections such as 
benefits, overtime pay, health insurance, social security, vacation time or protection from long work 
hours. They can be arbitrarily fired, mistreated, or discriminated against; they can be shortchanged 
on promised compensation. 
Patricia Anderson’s study of Jamaica’s transportation system included interviews of 293 informal 
drivers and workers. She found that 97.9 percent were paid in cash as a “deliberate attempt by the 
employers to avoid any form of record-keeping or proper accounting system, in order to evade the 
payment of income taxes.” Informal workers are therefore vulnerable to discrepancies. Her study 
included an interview with an informal minibus worker who described how he had no recourse 
when he was underpaid by his employer: “…him just fling it in mi hand and sey ‘gwan.’”47 
                                                          
46 Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 6. 
47 Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey. Mini bus ride: a journey through the informal sector of Kingston’s mass 
transportation system (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 
1987), 87-88. 
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Table 1. Shadow Economies in Percent of GNP 1999/2000
Country Shadow Economy 
Georgia 67.3% (highest) 
Azerbaijan 60.6% 
Bolivia 67.1% 
Jamaica 36.4% 
Mexico 30.1% 
Chile 19.8% 
France 15.3% 
Switzerland and United States 8.8% (lowest) 
Source: Schneider (2002: 6-19, Tables 3,5,7 and 9) 
World Bank Economist Friedrich Schneider conducted an analysis to measure the size of the 
informal economies of 110 countries. He combined the currency ratio method (growth of large bills 
used in economy) with a physical input 
method to find the difference between the 
officially registered GDP and the cross-rate of 
total electricity consumption to detect the 
growth of the informal economy. Using this 
method, Schneider concludes that Jamaica’s 
informal economy was 36.4 percent of GNP in 
2000.  All countries have informal economies 
of various sizes, and Jamaica falls in the mid-
range (see Table 1).48   
Various researchers utilizing different methods place the size of Jamaica’s informal economy 
between 30 to 50 percent of the labor force. As an example, the Microenterprise Unit of the Inter-
American Development Bank estimates that between 16 and 38 percent of the total active labor 
force is employed in microenterprises, the vast majority of which are unregistered and informal (95 
percent).49 Table 2 provides a summary of eight different approaches that estimate the size of the 
informal economy in Jamaica. Despite large variances in the estimates of each approach, all methods 
reveal a significant growth in the informal economy over the last several decades.
                                                          
48 Friedrich Schneider, “Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries Around the World” 
(working paper for the World Bank, 2002). 
49 Mark Wenner, “Microenterprise Development in Jamaica: Preliminary Assessment” (Washington, D.C.: working 
paper for IADB, 1996). 
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Table 2. Various Estimates of the Size of Jamaica’s Informal Economy – all demonstrating growth over 
time. 
Year 
Statin; 
Self-
Employed 
Anderson 
Witter Spath 
Bennett 
(Feige) 
Witter/ 
Kirton 
(Gutman) 
Witter/ 
Kirton 
(Feige) 
Kirton 
(Gutmann) 
1962         8.0 18.0   
1963         9.0 21.0   
1964         11.0 25.0   
1965         13.0 31.0   
1966         10.0 23.0   
1967         12.0 28.0   
1968         6.0 14.0   
1969         6.0 13.0   
1970         12.0 28.0   
1971         11.0 27.0   
1972 27.8       21.0 53.0   
1973         17.0 41.0   
1974     28.9   17.0 43.0   
1975 29.7       17.0 43.0 15.3 
1976         18.0 46.0   
1977 30.3 18.5   50.5 10.0 23.0   
1978     38.5 26.1 3.0 7.0   
1979     39.3 41.6 9.0 21.0   
1980 31.7   39.6 41.6 18.0 44.0 15.7 
1981       42.8 20.0 50.0   
1982 32.4     50.0 24.0 64.0   
1983   20.7   47.1 23.0 59.0   
1984       49.3 24.0 63.0   
1985 33.5 22.5   53.1     23.0 
1986       51.7     23.5 
1987       56.1     26.0 
1988 33.3     53.6     24.5 
1989 31.4 23.4   78.1     39.4 
1990 32.1             
1995               
1996               
1997               
1998               
1999               
2000               
2001               
2002               
Sources: Bennett (1991:14, Table 5), Kirton (1991:71, Table 3), Witter and Kirton (1990:7, Table 2.1), Statistical 
Institute of Jamaica (1973: 31 Table 12), Anderson and Witter (1991:83, Table IV; 64, Table 4.6), Spath (1984:75 
Table 2), Sander (1992: 111a, Table V.4). 
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0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Jamaican Labor Market Segmentation
% Male 45.30% 39.90% 9.80% 5.30%
% Female 53.00% 28.70% 15.30% 4.00%
Informal Secondary Formal Central Government Primary Formal
Table 3. Distribution of Workers by Labor Market Sector 
Source: Anderson (1987:161) 
 
Patricia Anderson adapted labor market survey data into an index that includes 
characteristics of Jamaica’s informal labor market. Anderson combined data from The National 
Mobility Survey and a Manpower Utilization and Training Needs Survey. The combined index 
allowed Anderson to estimate that 48 percent of the labor force operated within the informal 
economy in 1984.50  Table 3 summarizes Anderson’s findings on Jamaica’s labor market. The 
illustration is helpful because the small size of the formal economy becomes quickly visible 
compared to the large size of the informal sector demonstrated by the first two columns on the left 
(Informal and Secondary Formal). Anderson’s category of the secondary formal sector is semi-
informal, composed of domestic workers with limited worker benefits and protections. 
                                                          
50 Patricia Anderson,“Informal Sector or Modern Labour Market? Towards a Synthesis,” Social and Economic 
Studies 36 (1987): 149-176. 
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Considerable field research has been conducted to understand Jamaica’s informal economy.51 
To summarize the findings, a large portion of the informal sector includes those who are self-
employed in petty trade such as sidewalk vendors and higglers (individuals specializing in a 
particular type of trading, often importing and selling foreign commercial goods). The informal 
sector operates along a continuum of illegality, for example a portion of the informal economy 
includes transactions in illegal substances such as ganja, cocaine or crack, pirated CDs, or illegal 
services such as prostitution.  
On the opposite end of the continuum are those who make transactions with non-criminal 
goods but are unregistered or unregulated, such as the selling of brooms, arts and crafts, peanuts, 
roasted fish, jerk chicken and pork, domestic produce such as fresh fruit and vegetables, clothing, 
coal, empty bottles or newspapers. A large portion of the informal economy are those employed in 
domestic services such as gardening, hand-laundering clothes, cooking and cleaning of homes, care 
of children and other dependent persons. Other examples of informal service employment may 
involve unregistered taxi and minibus drivers, vehicle windshield washing at traffic lights, 
“watching” parked vehicles, vehicle repair, construction and appliance repair. 
                                                          
51 Patricia Anderson,“Informal Sector or Modern Labour Market? Towards a Synthesis,” Social and Economic 
Studies 36 (1987): 149-176; Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey, Mini Bus Ride: a Journey through the Informal 
Sector of Kingston’s Mass Transportation System (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
University of the West Indies, 1987); Michael Witter, “The Role of Higglers/Sidewalk Vendors/Informal 
Commercial Traders in the Development of the Jamaican Economy”(Kingston, Jamaica: working paper for the 
University of the West Indies, 1988); Janet Jalloul, “The Informal Sector in Kingston: a Description of Literacy, 
Educational Attainment, and Occupational Skills” (PhD diss., American University, 1988); Victoria Durant-
Gonzalez, “Higglering: the Rural Women and the Internal Market System in Jamaica” in Rural Development in the 
Caribbean, P. Gomes, ed., (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985); Neil De Marchi and Mary Morgan, eds., Higgling 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994); Ruth McLeod,  “Low Income Shelter Strategies in Kingston, 
Jamaica: Solutions of the Informal Sector” (Kingston, Jamaica: working paper prepared under contract to USAID,  
1988); Elsie LeFranc, “Petty Trading and Labour Mobility: Higglers in the Kingston Metropolitan Area” in Women 
and the Sexual Division of Labour in the Caribbean, Keith Hart, ed., (Kingston, Jamaica: Consortium Graduate 
School of Social Sciences, The University of the West Indies, 1989); Faye Harrison, “Women in Jamaica’s Urban 
Informal Economy: Insights from a Kingston Slum” in Blackness in Latin America and the Caribbean, Arlene 
Torres and Norman Whitten, eds., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988): 414-435; Melvin Edwards,  
Jamaican Higglers: Their Significance and Potential (Norwich, England: Centre for Development Studies, 1979); 
Alan Eyre, “The Shantytowns of Montego Bay, Jamaica,” Geographical Review 62 (1972): 394-413. 
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Table 4. Average Monthly Income by Labor Market 
Sector, reported in Jamaican dollars.  
Labor Market Sector Average Monthly Income 
Primary Formal $1051.66 
Central Government $645.12 
Secondary Formal  $447.21 
Large Agriculture $325.90 
Informal $248.93 
Source: Anderson ( 1987: 167) 
Anderson’s findings that there are more women in the informal economy than men are 
compatible with Jamaican Department of Statistics data stating that the rate of formal 
unemployment for Jamaican women (39 percent) is more than twice as high as that for men (16 
percent).52 Another Jamaica-based survey found that 80 percent of higglers and 52 percent of 
sidewalk vendors are women. For all categories of higglers the majority of the women were the sole 
support for their children, on average, 4.5 children per higgler.53  
Based on interviews, one researcher found that 70 percent of higglers were formerly 
unemployed and felt they had no alternative, and that those who went into higglering did so because 
of “unemployment, business failure, illness of a partner, too old, or not qualified to do anything else, 
or dislike for domestic work.”54 Start-up 
capital typically comes from personal savings, 
or credit from family and friends. Petty 
traders and higglers have low-income 
occupations, earning less or near to the 
minimum wage, although this data should be 
cautioned by noting that reported income was 
self-disclosed and may tend to be 
underreported. Those employed in the informal economy typically are low-income, living near or 
below the poverty line. Jobs in the informal sector may pay 60 percent less on average than those in 
the formal sector.55 Table 4 displays the differences in income compared across sectors. 
                                                          
52 Statistical Institute of Jamaica,“Statistical Abstract” (Kingston, Jamaica, 1978), 26. 
53 Victoria Durant-Gonzalez, “Higglering: the Rural Women and the Internal Market System in Jamaica” in Rural 
Development in the Caribbean, P. Gomes, ed., (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985). 
54 Michael Witter and C. Kirton, “The Informal Economy in Jamaica, Some Empirical Exercises” (Kingston, 
Jamaica: working paper for the University of the West Indies, 1990), 18. 
55 Carmen Deere, ed., In the Shadows of the Sun: Caribbean Development Alternatives and U.S. Policy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), 69. 
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 According to a report by an officer of the United Vendors’ Association, there are 15,000 
higglers selling in Parade (a busy market area in downtown Kingston) and adjoining areas. Based on 
reported data that each higgler supports 4.5 children on average, Witter approximates that Kingston 
higglering alone supports 67,000 people or about three percent of the population. 56  
 Although most Jamaicans support informal vendors by buying from them, most public 
statements and news stories portray them negatively. “Higglers have been repeatedly accused by the 
spokesmen of the manufacturers of undercutting the local market with cheap imports…there are 
frequent reports in the media of ‘aggressive’ behaviour by higglers at both Jamaican and foreign 
airports…According to a Stone Poll, 70% of the public supported the government’s attempts…to 
remove the higglers from the streets.”57  
 What may seem insensitive, intolerant and contradictory can be explained by problems 
created by informal businesses. In the absence of regulation for businesses, streets can become 
chaotic and unsafe, leading to dangerous traffic congestions, or environmental hazards. A Jamaica 
Gleaner news story provides an example:  
Brown's Town bus park losing thousands of dollars  
THE BROWN'S Town municipal bus park in St. Ann is losing thousands of dollars 
monthly…lost over $3,000 in May, and Mayor Giscombe disclosed in a statement 
today that much of the ongoing loss was accumulated by huge garbage clean-up bills. 
He says the excessive garbage results from too much illegal selling at the bus park, 
which is also being used as a prime illegal municipal garbage dump.58 
  
 
                                                          
56 Michael Witter, “The Role of Higglers/Sidewalk Vendors/Informal Commercial Traders in the Development of 
the Jamaican Economy”(Kingston, Jamaica: working paper for the University of the West Indies, 1988), 6. 
57 Ibid, 10-11. 
58 Jamaica Gleaner, “Brown's Town bus park losing thousands of dollars,” (August 26, 2003). 
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Table 5 Jamaica Business Regulation.  
Rating is measured 0-10, 10 being highest. 
Criteria Rating 
Extension of Credit to Private Sector 3.7 
Regulation of Business – Price Controls 4.3 
Administrative Obstacles for New Businesses 4.0 
Time Spent with Government Bureaucracy 1.8 
Ease of Starting a New Business 4.2 
Irregular Payments to Government Officials 5.0 
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2004: 105). 
 According to the World Bank, Jamaica has an uncompetitive high cost economy, with a 
fairly high ratio of taxes (25-26 percent) and high wages in the formal sector, which has reduced 
demand for labor in the formal private 
sector. Many Jamaicans feel that it is 
futile to even attempt to search for a 
formal job. This may explain why so 
many have moved into the informal 
economy to survive.   
There is little incentive for 
informal businesses to register and 
become formal. Table 5 highlights 
Jamaica’s rankings in the 2004 Economic Freedom of the World Report for various institutional and 
bureaucratic constraints facing entrepreneurs. The World Bank reported that in international 
comparisons of selected governance indicators, Jamaica ranked 38 out of 100 countries for the 
extent of bureaucratic red tape, which may further lessen the incentive for the informal self-
employed to legally register their businesses. 
Also affecting the business environment is corruption…bribery and lack of 
transparency in government contracts are considered by Jamaicans to be important 
problems. Jamaica ranks poorly in perceptions of favoritism shown by government 
officials towards well connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies 
and contracts. This is closely linked with the pressure exerted on businesses by the 
protection racket, and reflected in the high perceived costs imposed on businesses by 
organized crime (such as racketeering and extortion).59 
 
 
                                                          
59 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 117.  
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Table 6. Summary of Most Significant 
Problem Experienced by Workers in the 
Kingston Informal Sector.  
Most Significant Problem Percentage 
Slow Business 31.5%
Low Income 17.0%
Police Harassment 15.0%
Inflation 13.5%
Competition 8.5%
Poor Transportation 5.0%
No Shelter 3.0%
Long Working Hours 2.0%
No Problems 1.5%
Other Problems 3.0%
Source: Jalloul (1988: 105). 
III. Access to Property Right-Based Infrastructure 
Police Protection 
 Those who work in the informal sector, especially women, are vulnerable to theft and 
extortion. Because they are not operating legally 
registered businesses, they are naturally reluctant to 
seek protection from police or the court system. Often 
they must resort to bribery to police or suffer fines 
and confiscation of their goods. If they become 
victims of crime, it is doubtful that they would report 
the crime to the police. In a survey of 200 Kingston 
informal businesses, 15 percent of respondents stated 
that police harassment was their most significant problem (see Table 6). During the 1980s, official 
Jamaican government policy was to clear all of Kingston’s streets of informal sector vendors by 
1990, for the purpose of urban beautification to lure foreign investment.60 As police attempted to 
enforce this policy, tensions worsened. 
 Victoria Durant-Gonzalez is an anthropologist who lived amongst higglers for eighteen 
months to study their way of life. She found that many higglers spend four days a week gathering 
and buying produce in the rural communities where they live, and then travel to Kingston for the 
remaining three days a week to sell their goods. They deal with inadequate transport, and unsanitary 
and unsafe conditions. “They sleep at the market in conditions that are extremely harsh and 
inadequate, when the service they perform as major food distributors for the nation is considered. 
Women are to be seen sleeping on cold cement floors, on top of boxes, or nodding off while sitting 
on stools. Some protection from guards is available, but it is minimal; as a result the higglers are 
Page 28 of 85 
  
   
 
constantly exposed to thieves and violence.”61 For those who work in the informal economy, police 
crackdowns, rather than protection, are frequent. A Jamaica Gleaner news story illustrates the clash 
between police and street vendors, and the determination felt by each side: 
Cops crack down on illegal vending  
THE RURAL town of Christiana was paid a visit by the members of the anti-vending 
unit in the Jamaica Constabulary Force…sent scores of vendors, who were peddling 
their wares on Wildman Street and in the yard of the market, running in various 
directions as they made attempts to prevent their goods from being seized. A number 
of vendors voiced their disgust with the frequent visits being paid by the anti-vending 
unit. "Dem come here yesterday, cut up the stalls them, run we into the market, seize 
some of us goods and them still come back today. What we do why them coming here 
so often?” questioned one vendor… Sergeant Farquharson, of the Island Special 
Constabulary Force (ISCF), based at Harman Barracks, told The Gleaner … that the 
unit would continue to visit Christiana, Spaldings and all towns where street vending 
is a problem until the illegal practice is stamped out.62 
 
Safe Transportation and Roads: 
Transportation available to Jamaicans is mostly operated informally, outside formal 
regulation, licensing and taxation. Jamaicans can’t count on predictable timetables or regular routes 
because drivers change routes to avoid police. Financial incentives motivate drivers to load vehicles 
to above-capacity, with passengers sometimes hanging out of open bus doors or children sitting in 
open taxi trunks. These vehicles are then driven at aggressive speeds on dangerous road conditions. 
A study of Jamaica’s informal transportation system concluded: “the large number of serious road 
accidents involving minibuses, as well as the tragic deaths of school-children who fell from over-
crowded buses, further served to underline the need for improvement in the system.”63   
Drivers often carry weapons (machetes or guns) for protection, particularly when driving 
through unsafe neighborhoods at night. An additional danger comes from legal taxi operators who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
60 Janet Jalloul, “The Informal Sector in Kingston: a Description of Literacy, Educational Attainment, and 
Occupational Skills” (PhD diss., American University, 1988), 38. 
61 Victoria Durant-Gonzalez, “Higglering: the Rural Women and the Internal Market System in Jamaica” in Rural 
Development in the Caribbean, P. Gomes, ed., (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), 121. 
62 “Cops crack down on illegal vending,” Jamaica Gleaner,  June 4, 2003.  
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Figure 3. Poor road conditions due to unplanned development. 
Photograph by Collin Reid, Associated Press, 2002. 
pay the fees for licensing and insurance and resent the loss of passengers to cheaper illegal taxis. At 
times this tension erupts into open conflict. Drivers regularly use intimidation and violence towards 
competing drivers, often parking minibuses in such a way to block other vehicles to load up their 
passengers first. Bus parks are some of the most violent places in Jamaica, yet they are an 
unavoidable reality for most commuters, including school children. 
Massive uncontrolled informal housing developments result in the government’s inability to 
plan and zone 
roads. Poor roads 
are extremely 
vulnerable to 
flooding, and 
such conditions 
affect everyone. 
People can’t get 
to work, and 
children can’t get 
to school. Parents 
sacrifice to send their children to the best schools, often requiring travel over long distances. Drivers 
will tend to charge excessive fairs or even refuse to go into some communities. It is common for 
people who work in Kingston to commute daily from places as distant as Mandeville (65 miles to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
63 Patricia Anderson and Hilary Bailey, Mini Bus Ride: a Journey through the Informal Sector of Kingston’s Mass 
Transportation System (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West 
Indies, 1987), i. 
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the west), despite poor road conditions.64 Transportation costs for some shanty town dwellers have 
reached as high as 44 percent of take home pay.65  
Poor roads create severe problems for the agriculture industry. The following account 
describes the inefficient methods that farmers are relegated to due to poor road infrastructure: 
The farmers have developed ways of adjusting …(a) in the event of a landslide they 
have to work as a group to clear the roads in order to return to normality as soon as 
possible (b) they stay overnight in local marketplaces (c) they pool their 
transportation of produce to the marketplace (d) they rely on home made handcart 
and donkeys; and they transport produce on their heads along rugged paths.66   
 
The combined factors of poor roads, unregulated transportation, lawlessness and crime not 
only affect the ability to move people and goods, but affect the tourism industry. Jamaica’s economy 
is heavily dependent on tourism. Note the travel warning that the U.S. Department of State provides 
to U.S. citizens considering travel to Jamaica:  
Nighttime driving is especially dangerous and should be avoided whenever possible. 
As noted above in the section on Crime, public buses are often overcrowded and 
they are frequently a venue of crime. Travelers who use taxicabs should take only 
licensed taxicabs having red-and-white PP license plates… Most roads are paved, but 
suffer from ill repair, inadequate signage and poor traffic control markings. City roads 
are often subject to poorly marked construction zones, pedestrians, bicyclists, and, 
occasionally, livestock. Street corners are frequented by peddlers, window washers, 
and beggars walking among stopped cars.67 
 
Physical Infrastructure and Utilities: 
Alan Eyre, a Geographer who has conducted multiple case studies of informal housing 
provided the following description of a Kingston informal community: 
…basic amenities and services are uneconomical, temporary and piecemeal in nature, 
and inefficient in operation. Laments are frequent and often justified about water, 
sewage, flood control, garbage disposal, and lighting. There is no fire station, and the 
                                                          
64 Colin Clarke and David Howard, “Class, Unemployment and Housing Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since 
Independence” (working paper, Nd.) 
65 Alan Eyre, “The Effects of Political Terrorism on the Residential Location of the Poor in the Kingston Urban 
Region” Urban Geography 7 (March 1986): 227-241. 
66 Jamaica Sustainable Development Network,“Sustainable Agriculture” (working paper, Nd). 
67 U.S. Department of State,“Consular Information Sheet – Jamaica”  (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2005). 
Page 31 of 85 
  
   
 
police operate from a converted trailer. Storm water floods homes irregularly but 
seriously. Public transportation is a nightmare, as none originates in the settlement. 
Consequently buses pass through in an already grossly overcrowded condition. 
Residents state that three hours is not an unusual length of time to wait in a morning 
for transportation to school or to work.68 
 
Informal housing developments are built outside the regulatory environment, and lack 
proper zoning, water and sewage infrastructure. A USAID survey of 677 informal households in 
Kingston found that the factors cited most frequently as things that respondents disliked about 
where they lived were: violence, flies pollution, garbage and rats, with violence being cited in all areas 
surveyed.69 The survey found that although 90 percent of the residents obtain water from the public 
water supply in one way or another, 35 percent accessed water piped into shared yards rather than 
into their homes. The Urban Institute found that there are some cases where water must be carried 
three miles from the nearest standpipe, and in other cases one standpipe may serve as many as 2000 
people.70 Thirty percent of the households shared bathing facilities, and 45 percent of households 
relied on toilets used by sixteen people or more. A heavy reliance on pit latrines (47 percent) has 
increased ground water pollution.71  
Given the lack of clear ownership and addresses for billing and payment collection, utility 
companies find it difficult to provide services to informal housing developments. At times utility 
companies threaten to withdraw completely from specific urban neighborhoods due to widespread 
utility theft, as illustrated by a news story in The Jamaica Gleaner: 
JPSCo cuts 300 illegal connections  
THE JAMAICA Public Service Company (JPSCo) disconnected nearly 300 illegal 
electrical connections…"For years we have been trying to get rid of illegal 
connections. What we have now is a more concerted effort to continuously carry out 
raids to deter people from connecting illegally and reduce the propensity for future 
                                                          
68 Alan Eyre, “Quasi-Urban Melange Settlements: Cases from St. Catherine and St. James, Jamaica,” Caribbean 
Review 8 (1979), 98. 
69 Ruth McLeod, “Low Income Shelter Strategies in Kingston, Jamaica: Solutions of the Informal Sector” 
(Kingston, Jamaica: working paper prepared under contract to USAID, 1988). 
70 Urban Institute, “Jamaica: The Urban Management Gap” in Urbanization in the Caribbean: Prospects and 
Management Priorities (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1990). 
71 Ibid, 114. 
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electricity thieves," Major George Kates, General Manager of JPSCo's Asset 
Protection Department said. … "In Montego Bay there are softer areas where we can 
go without police but there are some no-go terrains where we just can't go unless we 
have a strong detachment of police."72   
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 The research gathered in this chapter demonstrates the extent of the widespread absence of 
property rights in Jamaica. It affects Jamaicans’ everyday quality of life regarding housing, work, 
security, and public infrastructure. By most estimates, 50-70 percent of housing is outside the legal 
regulatory structure, as well as approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Without protection of 
their property, many Jamaicans are more vulnerable to crime, inadequate housing and infrastructure, 
and unprotected labor. Chapter four explores the relationship between this widespread lack of 
property rights and economic underdevelopment in Jamaica. 
                                                          
72 “JPSCo cuts 300 illegal connections,” Jamaica Gleaner, October 3, 2003. 
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Table 7. Jamaica and GDP 
Year 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avg 95-02
GDP growth, 
annual % change 5.5 0.5 -1.3 -2.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.0
 
Source: World Bank (2004: 12 Table I)  
CHAPTER 4: HOW THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS INHIBITS  
 DEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA 
 
Economic Growth in Jamaica over the last Several Decades 
There is a rapidly growing consensus that economic growth remains the best antipoverty 
program in the world. 73 “Evidence suggests that growth is by far the most effective way of 
alleviating poverty in the developing world. With growth comes rising incomes…food, medical care 
and clothing…tax revenues that can be spent on public goods like clean water and decent schools.”74  
Between 1952 and 1972, Jamaica was the model of successful development and growth. 
Much of this success can be attributed to several key economic driver industries. Jamaica was the 
world’s leading producer of bauxite and aluminum, which experienced tremendous growth during 
and post WWII, tourism was flourishing, as was business and investor confidence. With a real GDP 
growth of more than six percent a year, Jamaica was considered an economic miracle. 75  
This pattern changed dramatically in 1972, after which point Jamaica’s growth rate has been 
negligible. Table 7 provides data on Jamaica’s recent growth rate, which the World Bank 
summarizes: “measured GDP growth has been disappointing since 1972, and was negligible over the 
1990s despite high measured rates of investment.”76  
This sudden change in growth can partially be explained by external macroeconomic and 
geopolitical conditions. As an import-dependent, monocrop economy (cane sugar), Jamaica has 
                                                          
73 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 315. 
74 “The G8's African challenge,” The Economist Online, July 7 2005. 
75 Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald 
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 140. 
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always been vulnerable and dependent on external conditions. As markets have opened over the last 
several decades, the world began buying sugar from other Latin American countries that produced 
less expensive beets sugar rather than from cane. Energy shocks have had a dramatic effect on 
Jamaica; a sudden rise in the price of oil in 1974 increased the nation’s energy import bill from J$65 
million to J$177 million.77  
During the Cold War era, Jamaica’s domestic politics affected its relationship with its 
primary benefactor, the United States. Michael Manley’s PNP party, a democratic socialist regime, 
took office in 1972. Manley’s administration flirted with Cuban style socialism, resulting in severe 
repercussions for Jamaica’s economy. Capital flight ensued, with an estimated net private capital 
outflow of US $412 million between 1976 and 1980.78 As investment dwindled, Jamaica’s 
relationship with Washington D.C. became strained. Widespread political unrest, crime and violence 
brought about a decline in tourism. Additionally, Manley imposed a bauxite levy that resulted in U.S. 
aluminum companies such as Alcoa replacing Jamaica with Australian suppliers of bauxite.79  
During Manley’s regime, Jamaica failed IMF financial performance tests and loans were 
suspended.  Between 1977 and 1990 there were a series of complimentary and interlocking 
agreements: IMF agreements, World Bank structural adjustment loans, sector adjustment loans and 
programs, IDB adjustment loans and USAID conditionality. Conditionality typically hinged around 
market liberalization and austerity measures, to which the Marxist-Leninist leaning Manley regime 
was unreceptive.  
The general election of 1980 swept Edward Seaga’s JLP party into power, more closely 
aligned with capitalism. Cuban diplomats were expelled, relations resumed with Washington D.C., 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
76 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004). 
77 Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 72. 
78 Patricia Anderson and Michael Witter, “Crisis, Adjustment and Social Change” in Consequences of Structural 
Adjustment: A Review of the Jamaican Experience, Elsie Le Franc, ed., (Kingston, Jamaica: Canoe Press, 1994), 11. 
79 Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald 
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 182. 
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and investment began to seep back into Jamaica. Reagan himself personally petitioned U.S. 
investment banks and the private sector to take an interest in Jamaica. Interestingly, the IMF did not 
impose the same harsh conditionality on Seaga’s regime as it enforced upon Manley’s socialist 
government in the 1970’s.80  In fact, “…in the late 1980s when the IMF required the Jamaican 
government to increase capital reserves held in banks, USAID lent Jamaica millions of dollars to 
pass the IMF tests.”81 Despite the regime change, Seaga’s regime inherited a “…virtually insolvent 
economy.”82 Despite significant economic reforms that met the approval of the IMF, at best Seaga’s 
government “…managed to arrest Jamaica’s economic deterioration. But the recovery was far from 
spectacular.”83 Macroeconomic conditions continued to haunt Jamaica, particularly the fall in world 
demand for aluminum. 
In the mid 90’s, Jamaica experienced a severe financial crisis attributed to speculative lending 
paired with weak institutions and poor credit decisions. Mass insolvencies were bailed out by the 
Government of Jamaica, leading to the enormous government debt of 150 percent of GDP. Today 
Jamaica has one of the highest debt ratios in the world, and has never recovered from its financial 
crisis.84 
At present, the World Bank attributes Jamaica’s poor growth performance to several factors: 
lack of competitiveness due to a high government debt burden, high costs due to soaring crime 
rates, an adverse external climate, an internal financial crisis, and financial liberalization 
unaccompanied by appropriate regulatory strengthening. Although the World Bank’s conclusions do 
not make an overt connection to property rights, the relationship becomes apparent with a closer 
                                                          
80 Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 108. 
81 Thomas Klak, “Excluding the Poor from Low Income Housing Programs: The Roles of State Agencies and 
USAID in Jamaica,” Antipode 24 (1992), 91. 
82 Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald 
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 205. 
83Ibid, 205. 
84 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 85-98. 
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analysis. The remainder of this chapter examines how the absence of a functioning and enforced 
property rights system affects access to credit, corruption, business investment climate, and 
government ability to collect taxes, all of which negatively affect growth. 
 
Property Rights and Access to Credit  
Based on studies of small businesses in Jamaica, it is clear that there is severely limited access to 
credit. Without credit, businesses are not able to invest in and expand their operations, hire 
employees, or buy needed materials to turn into products. 85  This widespread lack of credit is closely 
related to the absence of property rights. A land title is typically required by banks as secure 
collateral for loans. Without collateral, banks are highly unlikely to take on the risk of a loan. 
In de Soto’s study of the informal economy, he predicts that without property rights and access 
to credit, small businesses are relegated to small local circles of trust where they get credit from their 
vendors and where they in turn provide credit to trusted local customers. LeFranc’s study of 866 
Jamaican higglers found this to be the case; 89 percent of higglers operated within a 10 mile radius, 
and their only credit came from trusted friends and their vendors, not from banks.86  
A comparative study of small business formation in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad concluded 
that “Jamaica has been the least hospital state to small enterprise development”87 particularly due to 
the lack of access to credit from commercial lenders. The study reported that amongst the small 
businesses participating in the survey, 80 percent of capital came from the owner’s savings, relatives 
or friends, and only 13.9 percent of capital came from commercial bank lending. A separate survey 
                                                          
85 For a case study of a Jamaican street vendor’s business growth after he received an influx of capital, see Huon 
Wardle, “Marshy and Friends: Informality, Deformalisation and West Indian Island Experience,” Social Identities 8 
(2002): 255-270. 
86 Elsie LeFranc, “Petty Trading and Labour Mobility: Higglers in the Kingston Metropolitan Area” in Women and 
the Sexual Division of Labour in the Caribbean, Keith Hart, ed., (Kingston, Jamaica: Consortium Graduate School 
of Social Sciences, The University of the West Indies, 1989). 
87 C.M. Henry, “Capital availability, small business formation and performance in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad: 
an Empirical Foray,”  Social and Economic Studies 39 (1990), 11. 
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of 866 higglers in Kingston found that only four percent of the respondents relied on banks and 
formal lending institutions because credit simply was not available to them. Rather, they relied on 
their own savings, loans from family or friends, or credit from the supplier of goods.88 Similarly, a 
survey of 200 self-employed Kingston workers found that “The most expressed need was for small-
scale loans to expand stock and enlarge the businesses; none of those in the study was able to meet 
that need.”89 
 There are several reasons why credit is not widely available. First, Jamaica’s high debt burden 
ties up most investment capital and prevents small business loans from being able to jumpstart 
private sector growth. Jamaica’s debt, at 150 percent of GDP, is amongst the highest ratios in the 
world, which affects the availability of credit to the private sector. The World Bank explains that 
“…with high and relatively risk-free returns on government debt, banks have become more 
reluctant to lend to private firms, especially small firms and start-ups, which constrains a potentially 
vibrant source of GDP and export growth.”90 
A second factor affecting access to credit is a lack of collateral when property such as homes, 
land or business assets is not legally documented. Banks are unlikely to provide credit without secure 
collateral. For example, as Jamaica opened its agricultural markets to free trade, farmers were unable 
to borrow against their land to modernize and compete because they did not have land titles as 
collateral.91 A survey of 677 informal Kingston households concluded: 
The main constraint resulting from lack of formal employment is that it tends to 
make it extremely difficult to access formal financial systems for credit purposes. 
Insurance, mortgage financing, income generating loans, and overdrafts are not 
                                                          
88 Elsie LeFranc,“Petty Trading and Labour Mobility: Higglers in the Kingston Metropolitan Area” in Women and 
the Sexual Division of Labour in the Caribbean, ed. Keith Hart (Kingston, Jamaica: Consortium Graduate School of 
Social Sciences, The University of the West Indies, 1989). 
89 Janet Jalloul, “The Informal Sector in Kingston: a Description of Literacy, Educational Attainment, and 
Occupational Skills” (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1988), iii. 
90 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004), 6. 
91 Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald 
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eagerly extended to those without proof of “respectable” i.e. formal employment 
status…Few formal financial institutions for instance take their services to the 
informal markets where most of the informal sector’s economic activity takes place.92 
 
Banks are unwilling to take on high risk. Without legally registered titles there is no mechanism 
or authority to foreclose or evict those who do not pay their mortgages. The lack of a credit 
reporting system creates moral hazard; those who default do not face risk or consequences. With 
payments based on an honor system it is not surprising that 94 percent of NHT (National Housing 
Trust) government housing scheme mortgages were not up to date in 1988 and 28 percent were one 
year or more in default.   
Without widespread credit, Jamaica has been unable to develop a flourishing mortgage market. 
Mortgage markets are critical to a functioning economy, providing a credit engine for the 
construction industry to grow, as well as providing a method for savings and investment as 
homeowners build equity over time.  
In sum, a widespread absence of property rights has affected access to credit in Jamaica, creating 
repercussions that negatively affecting growth.  Without credit, there is less investment in business 
growth and jobs, preventing businesses from enlarging beyond their respective community 
environments. 
                                                          
92 Ruth McLeod, “Low Income Shelter Strategies in Kingston, Jamaica. Solutions of the Informal Sector” (Kingston, 
Jamaica: working paper prepared under contract to USAID, 1988): 33. 
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Property Rights, Corruption and Crime 
See them fighting for power 
But they know not the hour 
So they bribing with 
Their guns, spare-parts and money 
Trying to belittle our integrity 
They say what we know 
Is just what they teach us 
Thru political strategy 
They keep us hungry 
When you gonna get some food 
Your brother got to be your enemy 
   -Bob Marley93 
 
Corruption is generally regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to development, and 
Jamaica is no exception. On the surface Jamaica appears to have a functioning democracy, with two 
parties, freedom of speech, and a 2002 election that was recognized as fair by the Carter Center.94 
However, clientelism more accurately describes Jamaica’s political system. Clientelism is a form of 
institutional machine politics, an unofficial system of political organization based on patronage, the 
spoils system, and behind-the-scenes control behind the facade of a representative democracy. A 
dissertation study of Kingston’s political patronage system explained: “Clientelist politics tend to 
develop when there is a small elite group with access to material resources and a large group in need 
of material relief.”95 
In the absence of legally secure property rights for land, homes and business property, the 
political patronage system and entrenched government corruption fills the void with distribution of 
homes and jobs, based on an exchange of favors, such as voting for specific political parties. 
Researchers Bratton and Van de Wall distinguished an African neopatrimonial regime type where 
                                                          
93 Bob Marley, lyrics to “Ambush in the Night” from the album Survival (Kingston, Jamaica: Tuff Gong Recording 
Studio, 1976). 
94 Carter Center, “Pre Election Statement on Jamaica Elections” (Atlanta: Carter Center, May 31, 2002). 
95 Amanda Sives, “Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica,” 
Latin American Perspectives 29 (2002): 72. 
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the executive maintains authority by dispensing personal patronage.96  This is particularly relevant to 
Jamaica given its historical and cultural African legacy and a population that is 91 percent of African 
heritage. Jamaicans themselves commonly refer to their clientelistic system as political tribalism. 
Numerous studies on political corruption in Jamaica provide detailed accounts: 
What emerged in Jamaica in the 1950s and 1960s, despite superficial similarities to 
the political norms of Western liberal democracy, was a clientelistic style of politics, 
whereby the political elite functioned as brokers, channeling state patronage both to 
the depressed masses and to the capitalist class.97    
 
Most important, the PNP (People’s National Party) and JLP (Jamaican Labour Party) 
are both committed to the intensive use of political patronage; that is to say, the 
scarce benefits that flow from government policies and expenditure in the form of 
jobs, housing, contracts, and so on should be allocated to party supporters. In a 
sense, it is possible to view the two-party system in Jamaica as a continuing struggle 
between rival patronage machines (emphasis added). 98 
 
Provision of homes and jobs became a major political exercise carried out for the 
benefit of supporters of the victorious party.99 
  
In reality, there is little difference between Jamaica’s two parties. There is little intra-party 
competition and both are famous for being heavily and openly engaged in patronage. This may 
explain why no grassroots efforts or political pressure groups exist in Jamaica to pressure for 
reforms that make property rights more accessible. As a study of Kingston’s political dons finds, 
“The ability to contain radicalism either by absorbing it, repressing it, or ensuring that it never 
surfaces has been one of the key strengths of the Jamaican elite. The political parties have played the 
crucial role in ensuring that this occurs, and clientelism has been a key element in this strategy.”100 
There is evidence that clientelistic systems lead to decreased mobilization and increased territorialism 
                                                          
96 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa” World 
Politics 46 (July 1994). 
97 Anthony Payne, Charting Caribbean Development (Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 67. 
98 Carl Stone and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Jamaica” in Five Small Open Economies: A World Bank Study, Ronald 
Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 145. 
99 Alan Eyre, “The Effects of Political Terrorism on the Residential Location of the Poor in the Kingston Urban 
Region” Urban Geography 7 (March 1986), 228. 
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Figure 4 Military presence during elections in inner city communities. 
Photograph by Andres Leighton, Associated Press, 2002. 
Jamaican Army soldiers patrol the Trench Town neighborhood in Kingston, Jamaica, Tuesday, 
Oct. 15, 2002 a day before the general elections. Some 25,000 police and military personnel will be 
on hand during the Oct. 16 election.  
“as the poor focus their political energies on acquiring handouts and gaining the attention of the 
political bosses.”101  
Jamaica’s patronage political system has a historic legacy of offering jobs, homes, local 
infrastructure, 
and at times 
weapons, in 
exchange for 
loyalty or 
votes. 
Elections are 
especially 
violent times 
in Jamaica 
(see figure 4). 
 
 Garrison communities are entire gang-controlled neighborhoods that vote as a block for a 
candidate in exchange for benefits, with heavily armed badmen or dons in control.102 Bob Marley’s 
lyrics describe the plight of impoverished Jamaicans caught in the crossfire of political violence. 
When a Jamaican garrison neighborhood marks its borders with green JLP graffiti, PNP supporters 
enter those communities on risk of their lives (see figure 5). Not unrelated, Jamaica’s pervasive high 
                                                          
101 Derek Gordon, Patricia Anderson, and Don Robotham. “Jamaica: Urbanization During the Years of Crisis” in 
The Urban Caribbean: Transition in the New Global Economy, Alejandro Portes, Carlos Dore-Cabral, and Patricia 
Landolt, eds., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 192. 
102 James Kerr, “Behind Jamaica's Garrison Parts I – V” (Kingston, Jamaica: working paper for the Jamaica National 
Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997); Colin Clarke and David Howard, “Class, Unemployment and Housing 
Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since Independence” (Kingston, Jamaica: working paper, Nd.); Alan Eyre, “Quasi-
Urban Melange Settlements: Cases from St. Catherine and St. James, Jamaica,” Caribbean Review 8 (1979): 95-100; 
Page 42 of 85 
  
   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Political graffiti marking the JLP side of the border in an informal community in Kingston. 
Photograph by Alan Eyre, 1984. 
 
crime rates include the third highest homicide rate in the world, and looting, arson, theft, powerful 
organized crime, extortion and fraud are rampant.103 
The systemic problems of the absence of property rights, corruption, and vulnerability to 
crime mutually reinforce each other. There is evidence that the level of patronage or clientelism 
within a nation’s political system positively influences the size of the informal sector.104 A lack of 
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property rights makes people more vulnerable to corruption and crime. It is the lawless zones of 
squatter communities populated by informal workers that are most likely to be garrison 
communities. Where they do not have access to police protection from the state, people will resort 
to seeking protection from the crime underworld. Local political chieftains or drug dons fill this 
void, as explained by a geographer’s survey of political terrorism in Kingston slums:  
Security often becomes a paramount consideration in residential location. The choice 
is often between residing in the perceived relative safety of a high density urban 
location protected by organized para-military, vigilante, or private security 
organizations, or living in a peripheral location which may be far from the main foci 
of conflict but yet offers less protection from specifically directed terrorist attacks.105 
 
Lacking protection for their property, lacking police security and rule of law, the poorest Jamaicans 
are particularly vulnerable to the political violence that upholds a corrupt clientelistic system. There 
is evidence that indicators of corruption are negatively correlated with important economic 
outcomes.106 Corruption reduces efficiency, economic growth, per capita income, and affects child 
mortality and literacy.107  
 
Property Rights and Business Investment Climate 
Many conditions affect investors’ decisions, including the macroeconomic climate, tax 
incentives, interest rates and exchange rates. However, an absence of property rights also particularly 
affects the decisions of both foreign and domestic investors in Jamaica. There is a higher risk for 
investors when there is a lack of security for business property and assets, and widespread extortion 
and theft. Investors must consider the risk of lower sales when prices are undercut by illegal 
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businesses and higher uncertainty when there is poor infrastructure such as unsafe roads and 
undependable utilities. As stated one researcher, the absence or property rights directly increases the 
cost of production because of “…time spent on bribery, avoiding licenses and taxes, and seeking 
private sector alternatives to public services.”108 
Crime significantly creates a higher cost for doing business, requiring most businesses to 
employ private security guards or succumb to the pressure exerted by organized crime to utilize their 
protection racket. The World Bank estimates that an improvement in Jamaica’s rule of law to that of 
the level of other Caribbean nations such as the Bahamas would lead to a 50 percent increase in 
foreign investment: 
Crime costs Jamaica at least 4 percent of GDP, including lost production, health 
expenses, and public and private spending. In addition, exporting firms’ security costs 
can be as high as 5 percent of sales, small firms’ losses due to extortion, fraud, 
robbery and arson can be 9 percent of revenue, with an average of 3-6 percent for 
firms in manufacturing and distribution. The costs of crime limit growth. Some 10-20 
percent of firms in the business survey suggested that they may close down in the 
next three years because of crime.109 
 
These costs include elaborate accounting systems to police workers and inventory, extensive 
surveillance systems, security guards and dogs, special fencing, grill works and alarm systems. Sixty 
percent of large businesses use armed guards. A realistic fear of crime affects workers during their 
commutes through dangerous bus parks and communities; most workers refuse to commute or 
work after dark, and few businesses are able to operate second or third shifts, affecting efficiency. 
Call centers that have attempted to establish operations during the night have struggled to find 
employees willing to work after dark. 
A case study of fruit processing companies in Jamaica provides a good example of how 
vulnerable companies are to extortion and how this affects costs. Interviews reveal that proprietors 
                                                          
108 Clifford Zinnes and Yair Eliat, “The Shadow Economy in Transition Counties: Friend or Foe? A Policy 
Perspective,” World Development 30 (2002), 1237. 
109 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 5. 
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and their foremen have been pressured by local criminal bosses time and again to make their plant 
available for smuggling operations such that they must alter operations to prevent tampering with 
the product. They report a “constant fear of drug smuggling.”110 The plight of the fruit processing 
businesses reveals how vulnerability of property affects competitiveness and the bottom line due to 
increased security costs.  
Legally compliant businesses must compete with tax-evading businesses that do not comply 
with regulations, often operating on the sidewalk outside their storefront and undercutting their 
prices. A study of Jamaica’s competitiveness that conducted interviews with employers found that 
“the relative large informal sector in Jamaica is perceived as a major source of unfair competition.”111 
The Jamaica Gleaner interviewed a legal business owner who complained about illegal peddlers 
blocking store entrances: “when they buy the goods and just lay it out in front of the stores 
customers cannot get to enter the stores, so we end up losing.”112 Another news account describes 
the tension between illegal and legal vendors in a Port Antonio business district: 
The mayor noted…complaints from several store operators along the William Street 
strip, who have indicated that the progress of their businesses was being severely 
hampered. "The vendors were plying their trade at the doorsteps of the store 
operators, where these store owners were losing sales as they were prevented from 
entering the stores," he said.113 
 
Poor infrastructure such as unsafe roads and unreliable utility service affect investor’s 
decisions. The World Bank’s 2004 assessment of Jamaica’s investment climate found a high cost and 
inadequate coverage of infrastructure and utilities, “…particularly water and roads, and the 
unreliability of power supply.”114 Interviews with business owners reveal dissatisfaction with “…a 
                                                          
110 Derek Gordon, Patricia Anderson, and Don Robotham, “Jamaica: Urbanization During the Years of Crisis” in 
The Urban Caribbean: Transition in the New Global Economy, Alejandro Portes, Carlos Dore-Cabral, and Patricia 
Landolt, eds., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 214. 
111 Andrew Downs and Arthur Lewis, “Productivity and Competitiveness in the Jamaican Economy” (Washington, 
D.C.: working paper for the Inter-American Development Bank, July 2003), 14. 
112 “Downtown Kingston Vendors, Proprietors at Odds,” Jamaica Gleaner, October 26, 2001. 
113 “Parish Council Clamps Down on Illegal Vending,” Go Local Jamaica Online News, 16 July, 2004. 
114 World Bank, The Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 142. 
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poor mass transit system which makes it difficult for workers to get to their jobs and results in 
worker frustration.”115  
It is for many of these reasons that Jamaica has lost appeal as a location for business 
investment. Jamaica recently lost textile and tire production industries to lower cost countries such 
as Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As a note of caution, although FDI (foreign direct 
investment) has been relatively high, it has been capital intensive investment or portfolio investment 
in search of interest rate differentials, most of which has not resulted in growth or significant job 
creation. For example heavy investment in Jamaica’s bauxite industry has not created enough jobs to 
significantly increase employment rates. 
As a result of reduced investment in business formation, there are fewer formal jobs, and 
people remained trapped in a high unemployment economy where they must turn to the informal 
economy to survive. In this climate of underinvestment, a middle class cannot evolve, and 
development remains stagnant. 
 
Property Rights and Tax Collection 
 
Because of its massive informal employment base, the Jamaican government’s tax collection 
ability is diminished. One research team made the remarkable finding that tax evasion is so 
widespread that Jamaica has lost tax revenues equivalent to 84 percent of actual collections.116 
In 2004, a public finance team assigned to make recommendations for tax reform in Jamaica 
noted that “tax evasion is particularly problematic for the self-employed sector, where up to 90 
                                                          
115 Andrew Downs and Arthur Lewis, “Productivity and Competitiveness in the Jamaican Economy” (Washington, 
D.C.: working paper for the Inter-American Development Bank, July 2003), 25. 
116 James Alm, Roy Bahl, and Matthew N. Murray, “Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 39 (1991): 849-872. 
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percent of the self-employed escape the system of direct taxes.”117 The study analyzed the tax 
payments made by 4,084 formal workers and 932 self-employed informal workers and found that 
only 11 percent of the self-employed filed a tax return. The researchers estimated that across the 
board, undeclared income from Jamaica’s self-employed is J$600 million and that the actual tax base 
is only two-thirds of its potential.118  
The loss of revenues negatively affects the government’s ability to finance needed infrastructure 
and social capital. The government of Jamaica faces enormous pressure in paying down a debt 
burden that is 150% of GDP, one of the highest in the world, while maintaining a social safety net 
and stimulating growth in their economy:  
The share of government spending in the social sectors has fallen from 26% in 
FY1997/98 to 18% in FY2000/01, while the share devoted to debt management has 
increased from 49% to 58.2% during the same period. This situation severely limits the 
ability of the government to channel the required resources to the provision of social 
services, and the strengthening of the safety net.119  
 
Given its enormous debt, many of Jamaica’s social programs and interventions are funded by 
outside sources such as loans from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and 
western donor countries. If Jamaica did not suffer from such widespread tax evasion, perhaps it 
would not be as dependent on outside resources. 
As a result of widespread tax evasion, taxes in Jamaica are unjustly regressive rather than 
progressively distributed. The narrow base of formal workers who are compliant with tax regulation 
shoulder the bulk of Jamaica’s tax revenues. The fact that the majority of Jamaicans operates outside 
the legal system and do not pay taxes generates gross inequalities and inefficiencies in the income tax 
system. This severely affects growth in Jamaica by unfairly penalizing those few who are tax 
                                                          
117 Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, “AYSPS Shapes Jamaica’s Comprehensive Tax Reforms” (Atlanta: 
press release, Georgia State University, 2004). 
118 James Alm, Roy Bahl, and Matthew N. Murray, “Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 39 (1991): 849-872. 
119 The Inter-American Development Bank, “Jamaica Social Safety Net Reform Loan Proposal” (Washington, D.C.: 
working paper for the Inter-American Development Bank, 2001), 2. 
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compliant. In effect, it “discourages savings, investment, and work effort, while leading to capital 
(and human) flight.”120  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated a relationship between the absence of property rights in Jamaica 
and underdevelopment. Although certainly macroeconomic and external geopolitical circumstances 
strongly affect Jamaica’s growth, domestic property-rights related factors such as access to credit, 
corruption, business investment climate, and government ability to collect taxes all clearly affect 
Jamaica’s inability to spur growth and development.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE: THE INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL 
POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
 
International Policy Environment 
Most multilateral governance organizations and bilateral donor agencies are well aware of the 
problems associated with a widespread absence of property rights.121 The World Bank is probably 
the most active, sponsoring some of the most comprehensive research on the issue.122  Appendix 
VII contains a matrix of the World Bank’s direct policy recommendations to Jamaica regarding 
property rights. USAID has sponsored research of informal housing and tax reform in Jamaica.123 
The USAID-funded Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative (Appendix III) contains an online 
database and discussion boards for development and government professionals to share best 
practices towards establishing property rights.124 The Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Fund sponsors a cross-cutting project initiative entitled “Promoting 
Effective Property Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean” (see Appendix IV).  The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has conducted investigations of property rights as well.125 
                                                          
121 These organizations include the World Bank, IMF, ft, USAID, ILO, OECD and the UN. 
122 Shahid Burki and G Guillermo Perry, Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter (Washington, D.C., 
World Bank, 1998); Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance matters III: governance 
indicators for 1996-2002 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003); Phillip Keefer, “A review of the political 
economy of governance: From property rights to voice” (working paper for the World Bank, May, 2004); Norman 
Loayza, Ana Maria Oviedo, and Luis Serven, “The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality: Cross Country 
Evidence” (working paper for the World Bank, 2005); Friedrich Schneider, “Size and Measurement of the Informal 
Economy in 110 Countries Around the World” (working paper for the World Bank, 2002); World Bank, The Road 
to Sustained Growth in Jamaica 2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004). 
123 Ruth McLeod,“Low Income Shelter Strategies in Kingston, Jamaica. Solutions of the Informal Sector” 
(Kingston, Jamaica: working paper prepared under contract to USAID, 1988); Roy Bahl, ed., Final Report of the 
Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1990). 
124 The Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative, (working paper by the Broad-based Economic Growth Team 
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID, Nd.). 
125 Era Dabla-Norris and Scott Freeman, “The Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment” 
(Washington DC: working paper for the IMF, 1999). 
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The International Labour Organization (ILO) was one of the first multilateral institutions to 
research the problem of property rights in 1977.126 In fact, a search within their informal economy 
database returns 547 articles related to property rights. The ILO has funded specific research of 
Jamaica’s informal economy.127  
Similarly, a search of the OECD website reveals 175 research articles written on the informal 
economy, as well as a comparative case study of regulation and the informal economies in Jamaica 
and Ecuador.128 
The United Nation Development Program’s 2004 Assessment of Development Results in Jamaica 
made specific recommendations related to the massive informal economy129 and has also funded 
land tenure research.130 In January 2006 the UNDP announced the formulation of a new 
commission, the High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. The commission 
will be chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto. The Commission is charged with expanding access to property rights to the poor 
and marginalized segments of society. See Appendix II for the commission’s concept paper and 
mission.  
Although it is clear that multilateral governance and development organizations have 
conducted substantial research on property rights some questions remain. Are the study findings and 
recommendations both realistic and accessible to domestic government policy makers?  Are the 
research findings then being applied in the form of funding priorities, interventions and programs?  
                                                          
126 The International Labour Office, “The Urban Informal Sector in Africa” International Labour Review 116 
(1977): 343-353. 
127 Andrea Miller-Stennett, Informal Sector Training in Jamaica: an Assessment (Geneva: International Labor 
Organization, 2002). 
128 Victor E. Tokman and Emilio Klein. “Informal Sector and Regulations in Ecuador and Jamaica” (Paris: working 
paper for the OECD, 1993). 
129 United Nations Development Programme, “Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results in Jamaica” 
(New York: working paper for UNDP, 2004). 
130 United Nations Economic Commission, “Social and Economic Benefits of Good Land Administration” (working 
paper, 1998); Ibid, “United Nations World Investment Report” (2002). 
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It appears that although studies, papers and conferences are plentiful, actual funded interventions 
and programs are sporadic.  
After surveying all of the agencies for programs or interventions, there appears to be two 
property rights interventions in Jamaica. Since 1999, the Jamaican government and the Inter-
American Development Bank provide funding for a land title pilot project at a cost of US$12 
million.  The Land Administration and Management Programme (LAMP) strategically targets the 
informal sector. LAMP is intended to transform the informal sector in one parish by creating a more 
affordable and accessible land title registration system.131 Although the project moves Jamaica a step 
closer to providing more accessible property rights, it is important to note that it is a pilot project 
and benefits a small segment of the population in one parish on the island. Additionally, the ILO has 
funded employment training programs targeted at informal workers.132 Follow up research has found 
discouragement amongst participants who completed the training, because of the unavailability of 
formal employment despite their newly acquired skills.133 
Although USAID has substantially funded housing programs intended for low income 
Jamaicans, homes and mortgages are awarded to middle income Jamaicans rather than those with 
the most need. This misallocation of targeted funding is due to property rights. Although 
government housing schemes were intended for low-income Jamaicans, National Housing Trust 
(NHT) officers typically offer housing to those who work in the formal sector because of their 
ability to make automatic payroll deduction for mortgage payments, lessening the risk of default. 
Because the majority of low-income Jamaicans employed in the informal economy are paid in cash, 
                                                          
131 Jamaica Information Service, “LAMP Gets More Funding to Rationalize Land Use” (Kingston, Jamaica: press 
release, Government of Jamaica, April 1, 2004).  
132 Andrea Miller-Stennett, Informal Sector Training in Jamaica: an Assessment (Geneva: International Labor 
Organization, 2002).   
133 Mark Wenner, Microenterprise Development in Jamaica: Preliminary Assessment (Washington DC: Inter-
American Development Bank, 1996). 
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automatic payroll deduction is not feasible. Low income Jamaicans are therefore more likely to be 
turned down for NHT housing defeating the purpose of USAID’s program.134  
Why more property rights interventions are not funded in Jamaica is murky. It could be that 
Jamaica has not applied for funding, or perhaps because this is a newly recognized development 
issue. Whatever the reason, the end result is that despite enormous amounts of research, 
conferences, and publications there is little donor investment in programs to reform Jamaica’s 
property rights dilemma.   
 
Jamaican Civic and Nonprofit Organizations and Property Rights: 
International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) and non-profits based in Jamaica 
also seem to ignore property rights. In the author’s two years experience of doing development work 
in Jamaica, only one INGO worked on property rights issues: Habitat for Humanity International 
Jamaica (HFHJ).  
HFHJ’s program has been in jeopardy due to the widespread lack of land titles. The 
organization funds homes for the needy based on no-interest, at-cost revolving mortgages. The 
revolving fund is intended to be used for building new homes when families pay off their mortgages. 
Habitat had difficulties collecting mortgage payments from families because without land titles, loans 
were unsecured. With no threat of foreclosure families were not paying into the revolving fund. In 
2003, to avoid endangering their operations in Jamaica, the director made the strategic decision to 
recruit pro bono attorneys to work closely with housing applicants to obtain titles to land before 
mortgage contracts were written. In the author’s experience, Habitat is the only INGO or nonprofit 
in Jamaica that directly worked on property rights issues. It is possible that INGOs are not working 
on the issue of property rights reform because funding is contingent upon charity and voluntary 
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donations. It may be the case that other humanitarian issues that are more sympathetic and 
marketable crowd out property rights for funding priorities.  
In contrast, Jamaican civic associations are fairly active in dealing with informal vendors, 
although this relationship is often hostile. The Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the United 
Vendor’s Association have both lobbied the GOJ to remove informal vendors from busy market 
areas in downtown Kingston.135 At times there is cooperation with the Jamaica Vendors, Higglers 
and Markets Association, but this often degenerates into conflict. The relationship between the two 
associations is not always cooperative ― especially when higglers experience a drop in sales when 
they are forcibly removed from profitably byways to zoned areas that are more out of the way. 
Threats of violence, burning and looting inevitably bring police intervention. As one illegal vendor 
argued in protest, “The market thing just not going to work out. You go in there (allotted markets), 
and nobody not coming in. Business good right out here. So, all the people who going and coming 
from country, who just come off the bus and who have other business on King Street, is here so 
things must catch dem eye.”136 The City of Kingston has spent more than $20 million Jamaican to 
refurbish markets to house vendors, but these new-look facilities have remained relatively empty.137 
 
Government of Jamaica Policy  
The Government of Jamaica’s (GOJ) response to the widespread lack of property rights 
appears sporadic and inadequate. Few policies appear to be in place that recognize or attempt to 
resolve property rights issues. This inaction is typical of developing countries. In a recent study, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from Jamaica,” Journal of the American Planning Association 58 (1992): 336-346. 
135 For various accounts of conflict between the legal private sector and informal vendors, see “Vendors group 
demands clean-up of Coronation Market,” Jamaica Gleaner , December 7, 2002; “Downtown Kingston Vendors, 
Proprietors at Odds,” Jamaica Gleaner , October 26, 2001; “Councillor Storms out of Meeting,” Jamaica Gleaner, 
May 15, 2000: “Kingston Parish Church under 'siege' - Downtown vendors defy orders to move,” Jamaica Gleaner, 
May 18, 2002; “KSAC to clear streets - Street vendors to be removed by October 19,” Jamaica Gleaner, October 
10, 2001.  
136 “Downtown Vendors Defy Orders to Move,” Jamaica Gleaner, May 18, 2002. 
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Table 8. Level of Government’s Interest in Squatters’ 
Problems 
Perceived level of interest  Percentage 
A great deal of interest 5.3
Some interest 28.3
No interest at all 61.4
Don’t know 4.9
Source: Tindigarukayo, J. (2002: 109) 
researchers examined the policy priorities of governments throughout the 1990’s and found that 
little attention has been given to the issue of informal economies.138 
The World Bank’s opinion of the GOJ policy response is one of concern: “A fundamental 
problem with Jamaica's past pattern of development is that it has not gone far enough in breaking 
down the dualistic economy. A sharp contrast remains between the low-wage, capital-starved, largely 
informal or rural sectors and the capital-intensive, high wage sectors.”139 In the Planning Institute of 
Jamaica’s much acclaimed Survey of Living Conditions 2002 ― which is intended to be a comprehensive 
overview of national social issues ― there is no connection or mention of social problems and their 
relationship to property rights or even that a large informal sector exists. 
Geographer Alan Eyre conducted five case studies of the GOJ response to informal housing 
and found the official response severely lacking. At best “a few intellectuals and low-level 
functionaries from government and the private sector met from time to time to discuss the 
problem” but that overall, “the attitude of government, both JLP and PNP, was one of total 
disinterest and unconcern.”140 Table 8 
illustrates the results from a survey of 791 
squatters in Jamaica who tend to perceive the 
government as not interested in property rights 
issues.  
There are occasional public 
announcements by the GOJ related to property rights issues. For example, in 1998, a newly 
announced Micro-Sector Policy intended to shore up small businesses stated that “the GOJ intends 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
137 Ibid. 
138 Clifford Zinnes and Yair Eliat, “The Shadow Economy in Transition Counties: Friend or Foe? A Policy 
Perspective,” World Development 30 (2002), 1247. 
139 World Bank, “Jamaica, A Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, Country Economic Memorandum” 
(working paper, World Bank, 1994). 
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to provide the framework for the expansion and development of the micro-sector to enhance its 
contribution to economic growth."141 The strategy outlined a commitment to extend credit to micro-
enterprises, most of which are informal:  
To increase access to credit for individuals in the sector at the institutional level and at 
the product level. At the institutional level, Government will strengthen and maintain 
specialized credit institutions such as the People's Co-operative Bank and MIDA. In 
terms of products, these should be broadened to include a credit guarantee scheme, small 
loan fund and non-collateral lending ensuring that the credit delivery system is more 
efficient and effective.142  
 
The GOJ established the Micro Investment Development Agency (MIDA) to provide low 
interest credit to small businesses. In 2004, MIDA reported their expectation to “disburse $200 
million in new loans to finance approximately 2,080 micro businesses that should create close to 
2,810 jobs in various sectors of the economy.”143 As far as the results, it is unclear whether credit has 
been made more available since that time. A 1996 IADB study of microenterprise development in 
Jamaica concluded that the “credit granting institutions are far from financial self-sufficiency and the 
stronger ones have only reached the middle and upper strata of the micro and small business 
class.”144 The World Bank’s 2004 Road to Sustained Growth in Jamaica observed that access to credit 
remains severely limited.145 In 2004 the author personally worked with a dozen small informal 
business owners to help them write business plans and apply for small loans, yet none of them were 
successful in obtaining financing from micro-credit institutions or from commercial banks. All 
found the process difficult ― if not impossible ― primarily because they lacked collateral.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
140 Alan Eyre, “Self-Help Housing in Jamaica” in Self-Help Housing, the Poor and the State in the Caribbean, 
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143 Jamaica Ministry of Finance, “Micro Investment Development Agency Limited” (Kingston, Jamaica: 
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A contemporary reader would be hard pressed to find recent speeches and newspaper 
accounts of politician’s directives that reveal any significant attention to property rights. PNP 
Presidential candidate and current Minister of Finance Dr. Omar Davies is campaigning on a 
platform that emphasizes microenterprises and “self-empowerment,” with a commitment to 
providing better access to credit.146  In his presentation of the 2005 budget to parliament Davies 
acknowledged that the informal economy affects widespread tax evasion, and announced tax reform 
plans to widen Jamaica’s tax base. 147 The other candidates do not appear to be campaigning on 
property-rights related issues. 
The most active response of the GOJ towards property rights has been punitive. Substantial 
financial resources have been spent attempting to remove vendors148 and relocate squatters or force 
evictions from informal housing.149 
To conclude, it appears that GOJ policy towards property rights has been piecemeal, limited 
and concentrated in four areas: the LAMP pilot project for land titles, a tax reform plan targeted at 
widening the tax base, limited microcredit extended to informal businesses and punitive actions that 
remove informal vendors from the street and informal squatters from their communities. 
 
                                                          
146 See Omar Davies Presidential Campaign website: http://www.omardavies.org/news_archive.php (cited 19 
February, 2006). 
147 Omar Davies, “2005/2006 Jamaica Budget Opening Presentation” (Kingston, Jamaica: remarks addressed to 
Parliament, April 14, 2005), 15. 
148 See the following sources for accounts of government attempts to remove vendors from the streets: “Cat-and-
mouse game downtown Kingston - Vendors remain determined to cash in on Xmas sales,” Jamaica Gleaner, 
December 6, 2001; Michael Witter, “The Role of Higglers/Sidewalk Vendors/Informal Commercial Traders in the 
Development of the Jamaican Economy”(Kingston, Jamaica: working paper for the University of the West Indies, 
1988), 6; Ibid, 10-11; and Janet Jalloul, “The Informal Sector in Kingston: a Description of Literacy, Educational 
Attainment, and Occupational Skills” (PhD diss., American University, 1988), 38.  
149 For a detailed account of a squatter community and forced relocation, see Alan Eyre, “Self-Help Housing in 
Jamaica” in Self-Help Housing, the Poor and the State in the Caribbean, Robert Potter and Dennis Conway, eds. 
(Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies, 1997), 86-91. Also see “Residents of squatter community cry 
foul - Eviction notices served on 250 families of Portmore Villas,” Jamaica Gleaner, December 6, 2001; 
“Downtown Kingston Vendors, Proprietors at Odds,” Jamaica Gleaner, October 26, 2001; “Parish Council Clamps 
Down on Illegal Vending,” Go Local Jamaica Online News, 16 July, 2004. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
Policy Recommendations  
Based on the findings in this research, The Government of Jamaica is urged to consider 
three policy recommendations:  
• Create a task force on property rights reform 
• Reform the political patronage system  
• Creatively seek funding and resources 
 
Chapter Four demonstrated that Jamaica can no longer afford to ignore the connection between a 
widespread absence of property rights and underdevelopment. Chapter Five established that Jamaica 
is typical of most developing nations in regards to property rights. As long as GOJ policy related to 
property rights continues to be sporadic and punitive, the status quo will be reinforced, leaving the 
masses trapped outside the legal structure.  
Alternatively, contemporary development research is pioneering more transformational 
approaches. For the first time, international development funding agencies, domestic governments 
(such as Thailand, Peru and Egypt), and INGOs such as Habitat for Humanity are recognizing and 
addressing the informal sector. By proactively taking on the problems of the informal sector now, 
Jamaica has a window opportunity to be in the forefront of the Caribbean economy. The GOJ may 
apply for funding and assistance from development agencies such as the World Bank, or the U.S. 
Millennium Challenge Account fund, for example. As the Prime Minister and her Cabinet address 
the root causes of a widespread absence of property rights masses of Jamaicans will be empowered 
to join the legal economy. They can be free to develop capital, small businesses, pay taxes and 
transform the economy from one dependent on external income sources and create its own 
sustainable wealth and development. 
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Recommendation I: Create a Task Force on Property Rights Reform 
The Prime Minister is urged to establish a task force on property rights reform made up of 
diverse and credible members reflecting all of the stakeholder interest groups: illegal business owners 
and squatters, legal business owners, bankers, INGO representatives and others. The task force 
should be charged with creating methods to research Jamaica’s informal sector, including 
determining its size, lost tax revenues and defining participants and interactions within the economy. 
The task force should hold publicized town meetings to raise awareness that social and economic 
problems are related to property rights, and to solicit input from Jamaicans. 
The task force should closely examine current regulations and government ministries and 
how they affect extralegals. Reforms should be researched to make legality more affordable and 
inclusive. From the point of view of economists, the size of the informal sector is explained by the 
heavy regulatory burden on legal businesses (e.g. taxes, red tape), which provide incentives to 
extralegal businesses to supply goods at a lower cost.150 Therefore, policy that reduces the regulatory 
burden will reduce the demand for goods and services sold in the informal economy.151  
Policy implementation must include compromises and attempt to minimize disruption to the 
economy and society. As the task force weighs the costs and benefits of regularization and 
enforcement of rule of law, they must be careful. It is important to acknowledge that despite the 
many problems of the informal economy, there are also benefits. The informal economy provides 
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low cost goods and jobs and is a source of competition that provides entrepreneurial experience to 
the workforce. It provides a platform for business creation despite corruption and bureaucratic 
obstacles. Therefore, actions should avoid being so punitive that they negatively affect the 
productive qualities of the informal sector. The goal should be to regularize ― not to stamp out ― 
small businesses. 
Based on their findings, the task force should draft policy solutions that reform taxation 
regulation, criminal justice policy and labor policy. Reforms should simplify red tape that hinders 
legality and reduce steps and fees so that legal land titles and business registration is within the grasp 
of the majority of Jamaicans instead of only the elite few who are in the propertied class.  
The task force should also research how to strengthen property rights institutions such as 
banking, insurance and rule of law ― without which foreign capital will not invest in Jamaica, and 
neither will Jamaicans. The task force should set measurable goals. For example, reducing the size of 
the informal economy by a fixed percent each year or increasing the number of registered land titles 
by a fixed percent each year would be useful metrics. 
 
Policy Recommendation II: Reform the Political Patronage System 
Chapter Four demonstrated that in the absence of legally secure property rights for land, 
homes and business property, the political patronage system and entrenched government corruption 
will fill the void with distribution of homes and jobs ― based on an exchange of favors, such as 
voting for specific political parties. Current theory projects that the level of patronage or clientelism 
within a nation’s political system positively influences the size of the informal sector.152 Policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000): Clifford Zinnes and Yair Eliat, “The Shadow Economy in 
Transition Counties: Friend or Foe? A Policy Perspective,” World Development (July, 2002): 1246-1250. 
152 Peter Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy 
Perspective.” Sociological Forum 4 (1989): 561-587; Stephen Knack and Phillip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures” Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 207-
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actions that reform Jamaican’s clientelistic political system are most likely necessary, not to mention 
painstakingly difficult. Jamaica must therefore ask itself “…under what conditions do governments 
have the incentive to ensure the rule of law, secure property rights, and a well-functioning 
bureaucracy, and more generally to serve the public interest?”153 A clientelistic political system is not 
that condition. It is acknowledged that this policy recommendation is by far the most difficult of all 
the solutions, will take exemplary leadership, consensus building, political willpower and self-
restraint of those in power.  
In order to champion these rights, there is a need for strong leadership to combat layers of 
entrenched elitist bureaucracy and corruption. Pulitzer Prize winning author Thomas Friedman 
argues that India’s Manmohan Singh, China’s Deng Xiaoping, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, and 
Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev are examples of leaders who reformed their economies and policy in 
order to make their nations more competitive. “They also create an environment below that makes it 
very easy for their people to start businesses, raise capital and become entrepreneurs.”154   
Detailed recommendations on reforming political patronage machines are outside the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, the strong leader who steps forward in Jamaica to combat the 
clientelistic system must implement strong anti-corruption laws, transparency, and rule of law.  The 
GOJ should seek out those on the government payroll who are obviously living above their means 
(e.g. the largest house in Kingston is owned by a police chief). Punishing the big fish sends a 
message of seriousness. The GOJ needs to implement civil service reform based on merit and 
accountability and reduce the “pool of rents available for bribery”155 by continuing to lower trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
227; David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
153 Philip Keefer, “A review of the political economy of governance: From property rights to voice” (working paper 
for the World Bank, May, 2004), 12. 
154 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 318. 
155 For policy recommendations on reforming corruption and the patronage system, see Kimberly Ann Elliot, 
Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 208. 
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barriers, eliminate unnecessary regulations and simplify essential ones to reduce the need for citizens 
to grease the wheels with bribes. 
 
Policy Recommendation III: Creatively Seek Funding and Resources 
Institution building reforms require financial resources, which are in short supply in 
developing nations. Some theories link property rights to a nation’s wealth: “As countries grow 
wealthier, more effort and resources are spent to define and protect property rights.”156 It is 
recognized that Jamaica may not be able to finance these policy reforms without outside donor 
assistance, and there are a growing number of financial resources that can be solicited for grants and 
financial assistance. 
Recent technological innovations in GPS, GIS and cadastral systems underscore the 
importance of property rights. When these technological innovations are paired with legally 
documented land ownership, new levels of intelligence gathering becomes possible. This intelligence 
allows for improved military tactics and territorial control strategies where lawlessness and narco-
terrorist activities typically thrive. Formal, legal land titles and records could be used for financial law 
enforcement to “trace ownership to national identification numbers and then to passports, 
telephone bills, etc.”157 Improved land records and mapping systems assist aerial tactics, such as 
spraying to destroy cocaine crops. Land records also assist war planners in the destruction of specific 
military targets and minimizing of collateral damage. Columbia has approached the U.S. military for 
funds for a land mapping system as part of efforts to combat Columbia’s drug trade. Jamaica is 
similarly of interest to the United States as a “major transshipment point for cocaine from South 
America to North America and Europe; (and the) illicit cultivation of cannabis; corruption is a major 
                                                          
156 Philip Keefer, “A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property Rights to Voice” (working 
paper for the World Bank, May, 2004), 18. 
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concern; (there is) substantial money-laundering activity; (and) Colombian narcotics traffickers favor 
Jamaica for illicit financial transactions.” (emphasis added)158 Jamaica may be well-served to develop 
a proposal to the U.S. military to fund improvements to their land mapping system. 
INGOs are a vast resource of funding and manpower. Habitat for Humanity International 
has a strong interest in its homeowners' ability to acquire land titles, and has partnered with the 
United Nations Development fund to assist with legalization of the poor projects. Habitat has an 
active office in Kingston and would be an interested stakeholder and resource.  
The new U.S. Millennium Challenge Account fund ― which may eventually replace the 
USAID model ― seeks proposals from governments that include property rights reforms. A recent 
news account describes Madagascar’s award of funding to work on property rights reforms: 
When the Bush administration invited Madagascar a year ago to apply for aid under a 
new US program, government officials here came up with a wish list of traditional 
development projects: a new hospital, more school spending, aid to rice farmers. US 
officials weren't impressed, writes The Wall Street Journal. "Can you convince us that this is 
going to bring economic growth to reduce poverty?" asked Clay Lowery, a top official 
with the Millennium Challenge Corp., the overseer of the president's program. 
Madagascar's leaders couldn't. So they began meeting with groups across the country, 
asking where the bottlenecks to economic progress lay. Officials kept hearing the same 
two complaints from farmers and small businesspeople: They couldn't get formal title to 
land because of a corrupt and decrepit bureaucracy, and they couldn't get loans because 
banks were growing fat investing in government bonds. Today, Madagascar President 
Marc Ravalomanana will be in Washington to attend the signing of a $110 million, four-
year aid package designed to fix those problems. It's the first grant ever under Bush's 
Millennium Challenge Account program -- and a test of whether the US has found a 
better way of delivering assistance. 159 
 
 The goal of the Millennium Challenge Account model is to aggressively support developing 
nations toward increased accountability, and strengthen institutions. A proposal from Jamaica to 
strengthen property rights is sure to be received with interest. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
157 Goeffrey Demarest, Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
military strategy paper for the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), 4. 
158 CIA World Factbook (2004). 
159 “New Bush Strategy on Aid Faces Test In Madagascar,” Noticias, April 19, 2005. 
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As multilateral and bilateral donor agencies are becoming more aware of the importance of 
property rights for development, their programs are also becoming a source for funding. Appendices 
II-VI provide more details about the following property-rights based initiatives as examples of 
resources for assistance and partnerships:  
 The USAID-funded Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative;  
 The Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund sponsors the 
Promoting Effective Property Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative;  
 UNDP has recently launched the High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor, charged with expanding access to property rights to marginalized segments 
of society;  
 Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center, The University of 
Maryland; and 
 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
This research assumes that the lack of access to a formal legal structure of property rights 
guarantees that Jamaicans seek alternatives outside the legal structure, but that if property rights 
became accessible Jamaicans would choose rule of law over anarchy and lawlessness. In the author’s 
experience with development programs in Jamaica any time Jamaicans had an opportunity to 
become legal affordably, they did so. 
This research approach is limited in that case studies are more difficult to generalize than is 
quantitative research. Further field research is warranted to provide stronger evidence of the claims 
made in this study. It would be especially helpful to have more evidence concerning the apparent 
lack of attention to property rights by government. Interviews and field research of government 
officials, civic associations such as the Jamaica Vendors, Higglers, and Markets Association, or 
community-based informal housing organizations, might illuminate whether there are vested 
interests that prevent property rights reforms.  
Although this research is asserting that there is a relationship between property rights and 
underdevelopment in Jamaica, we do not know the strength of the relationship, or what proportion 
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of underdevelopment is related to underdevelopment compared to other factors. Finally, the 
findings of this research are not intended to be construed that property rights are a magic bullet 
cure-all for underdevelopment. For example, a case study of a community in Argentina where half 
of the homes had land titles and half did not, found evidence of positive quality of life 
improvements for those with land titles. Because the people in the community did not have access 
to jobs, land titles were not enough to give the residents access to credit.160 Simply implementing 
land titles, for example, would not be enough if not accompanied by access to jobs. 
 
                                                          
160 Sebastian Galiani and Schargrodsky, Ernesto, “Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling” (working 
paper, August 9, 2005). 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Map of Jamaica 
 
(Source: Washington University Image Archive, Nd) 
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APPENDIX II 
Concept Paper and Mission for United Nation’s 
High Level Commission On Legal Empowerment Of The Poor (HLCLEP): 
An innovative intergovernmental initiative 
Website:  http://legalempowerment.undp.org/html/mission.html 
 
 
The initiative to establish the HLCLEP is built on the assumption and conviction that the fight 
against poverty can only be won, and the MDGs only achieved, if governments succeed in giving all 
citizens, especially the poor, a stronger stake in the economy through the protections and facilitative 
devices that only the rule of law can provide.  
 
The empowering benefits of broadening the rule of law can be realized through comprehensive 
reforms of laws, institutions and policies. These reforms must address specifically those aspects that 
have the broadest possible benefits in the fight against poverty. 
 
Key challenges include: 
 
• Making user’s and property rights accessible for all, especially the poor and marginalized, 
whether communities, groups or individuals;  
• Ensuring that the user’s and property rights of the poor and marginalized can function as 
means for economic and social empowerment, including obtaining credit and investment under 
conditions where they are not exploited;  
• Broadening access to organizational forms that allow poor and marginalized people to 
govern their rights collectively by dividing labor, combining assets, and assigning responsibilities 
productively in their own enterprises.  
• The overarching objective of the Commission is to contribute strategically to the struggle to 
achieve the MDGs, both globally and at the country level. In particular, the Commission’s aim is 
to contribute to reducing poverty by half by 2015, and making significant progress beyond this 
date. 
 
Whereas governments all over the world are struggling with this challenge and growing numbers of 
citizens and interest groups are demanding change, real success stories in implementing 
comprehensive reforms that benefit the poor are rare. This suggests that more effective tools and 
policies and harder efforts are needed. Concerted and focused international cooperation efforts to 
provide such tools and galvanize political commitment can provide a critical contribution at a time 
when policymakers around the world are increasingly focusing on and grappling with this challenge.  
 
To that end, the Commission has a six-fold agenda: 
 
I. To galvanize political support and commitment to a broad reform agenda for legal inclusion and 
empowerment of the poor. 
 
II. To examine ways to secure broader access to legal, fungible property rights over real and movable 
assets – and thus replacing, supplementing or improving existing local or national arrangements for 
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the purpose of expanding and improving their utility for bottom-up economic and social 
empowerment and poverty reduction.  
 
III. To examine ways to provide broad access to legal organizational forms suited for the poor and 
that enhance opportunities for growth so that poor people can combine labor, technology, and 
investment to raise productivity, limit risks and protect economic achievements; and leverage 
property to access credit and capital. 
 
IV. To investigate any conceptual gaps in linking asset security, property rights, and access to the 
rule of law to wider development issues. These include conflict prevention, gender equality, 
economic inclusion, governance, administration of justice, legal enforcement, identification systems, 
capital formation, access to credit, provision of infrastructure -- especially land, energy, water and 
affordable housing -- and other issues that will benefit poor and indigenous peoples. 
 
V. To draw up an inventory of reforms to promote asset security, and other efforts to link the 
formal and informal sector, that are based on global experiences to date and contributions from 
relevant expertise and stakeholders from governments, civil society, the private sector and 
international organizations from around the world. 
 
VI. To produce a Tool Kit for policy makers as a basis for solid, demand-driven support programs 
for reform at the country level. The Commission is inspired by all people around the world who are 
struggling daily to make ends meet, too often in a hostile environment of confusing and 
dysfunctional laws and enforcement systems—some formal and others informal. Despite the 
obstacles, people show an amazing ability to get by, feed their children and aspire for better lives and 
in so doing deserve our deepest respect and our full commitment.  
 
The Commission will draw on the work of those who have substantive experience developing and 
implementing complex reforms, particularly those that address legal empowerment and broadening 
the rule of law for the benefit of poverty reduction. Poor and informal groups will be engaged 
directly by the Commission and its working groups. The Commission will base its efforts on the best 
available knowledge and a range of experiences, whether from governments, non-governmental 
entities, informal sector interest organizations, international organizations, private firms or financial 
bodies, and especially bottom-up approaches.  
 
 
(source: United Nations, “High Level Commission On Legal Empowerment Of The Poor (HLCLEP)”  Nd.) 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Inter-Summit Property System  
Website: www.landnetamericas.org 
 
Initiative Background: 
The Charter of the OAS, which was signed in 1948, stipulates in Article 34 that Member States agree 
to devote their utmost efforts to accomplish: 
 
“d) Modernization of rural life and reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure systems, 
increased agricultural productivity, expanded use of land, diversification of production and improved 
processing and marketing systems for agricultural products; and the strengthening and expansion of 
the means to attain these ends.” 
 
The Summits of the Americas Process 
In 1996, property rights issues were included in the Summits of the Americas Process. Action plan 
of the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development: 
 
“Initiative 22. Clarify, in accordance with the legal system of each country and as necessary, land 
tenure and property rights, including with respect to indigenous and other local community areas, 
and identify additional steps that may be needed to improve sustainable forest management under 
the various forms of land tenure, taking into account the interest of all stakeholders.” 
 
Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, Chile April 18-19, 1998 
Property Registration Mandate from the Santiago Plan of Action 
 
Governments will:  
 
§Streamline and decentralize, as necessary, property registration procedures by: adopting transparent, 
simplified procedures for titling and registration; disseminating information regarding these 
procedures; utilizing, whenever feasible, state-of-the-art technologies for property geo-referencing, 
computer-generated mapping and computerized records storage; incorporating alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms; and avoiding overlapping administrative fees for titling and registration. 
 
§Recommend that multilateral and bilateral cooperation institutions, especially the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank, strengthen their financial and technical assistance 
programs, including information exchange regarding experiences among countries, to support 
simplified property registration procedures and to assure access for the poor to those systems. 
 
§In accord with national legal frameworks, implement measures, where necessary, to protect rights 
accorded to indigenous populations, as well as information programs, if needed, to assure greater 
awareness of indigenous populations of their rights, in this respect.  
 
Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Canada April 20-22, 2001 
In April 2001, the Heads of State and Governments of the 34 States of the Western Hemisphere 
met in Quebec City, Canada at the Third Summit of the Americas. The leaders of the Hemisphere 
agreed on a Declaration and Plan of Action.  
 
Page 69 of 85 
  
   
 
Excerpt from the Growth with Equity Mandate from the Quebec Plan of Action 
 
Governments will: 
Continue and deepen progress toward implementation of the agenda for improving property 
registration established at the 1998 Santiago Summit of the Americas with particular emphasis on 
regularizing informal property rights, in accordance with national legislation, to ensure that all valid 
property rights are formally recognized, that disputes are resolved, and that modern legal 
frameworks to legitimize property records and encourage marketable property titles are adopted; and 
that these actions include the formulation of institutional, political and regulatory reforms that 
would facilitate the use of property registration as a mechanism to enable property owners to access 
credit and allow commercial banks and MDBs to expand their customer base among lower income 
sectors; promote greater cooperation and exchange of information and technology to modernize the 
systems of registry and cadastre in the Hemisphere, and also request multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation institutions to continue supporting and strengthening, in a complementary manner, 
their financial and technical assistance programs. 
 
Special Summit of the Americas, Monterrey, Mexico January 12-13, 2004 
During the Special Summit of the Americas that took place January 12-13 in Monterrey, Mexico, the 
Heads of State gathered together to agree on a new Declaration. 
 
Excerpt from the Declaration of Nuevo León: 
 
We recognize that legally secure property rights are one of the essential elements for economic 
growth, since proof of ownership helps people to obtain loans and start businesses. 
Therefore, we commit, where necessary and appropriate, to: strengthen property rights and expand 
the use of property as collateral, ensuring enforceable, efficient, transparent, comprehensive, and 
equitable rules governing property contracts; and improve or promote the related measures 
governing the transfer of property, property registries, the use of property as collateral, and the 
rights and responsibilities of debtors and creditors. 
With regard to these measures, we commit to undertake concrete actions prior to the next Summit 
of the Americas to be held in Argentina in 2005, and to report at that time on progress achieved. We 
will seek to ensure that property rights benefit all people without discrimination.  
 
 
Fourth Summit of the Americas, Buenos Aires, Argentina November 4-5, 2005 
Growth with Employment mandate from the Plan of Action, Member States agree: 
 
“32. To stimulate the design or strengthening of mechanisms or initiatives for access to credit by, 
among other measures, the fostering of the property registry and cadastre, in which legal certainty is 
expressed, among other means, through the verification of the title and the use of it, ensuring that 
the property rights benefit all people without discrimination. 
 
 
(source: USAID, “The Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative” (Washington, D.C.: working paper by the 
Broad-based Economic Growth Team Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID, Nd). 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Inter-American Development Bank  
Multi-lateral Investment Fund (MIF) Cluster Action Plan 
Website: http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/files/propertyactionplan_eng.pdf 
 
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
I. Background 
 
1.2 The MIF cluster Effective Property Rights will contain from 10-12 projects that aim to improve 
the functioning of markets and the environment facing businesses and investors. Projects in the 
cluster address specific bottlenecks in the web of laws, regulations and institutions that prevent 
moveable and immoveable property from serving as the foundation of private sector development 
and wealth. As part of a cluster, these projects share the same technical theme and development 
goals, and hence can be managed and monitored as a group. This will promote the effective and 
sustainable use of MIF resources, generate scale economies and foster the dissemination of project-
specific information and experiences that feed into important lessons learned and best practices. 
These projects will be innovative, combining existing models with newer approaches to promote 
catalytic demonstration effects across the Region. 
 
Breathing Life into Dead Capital 
1.3 All business transactions and investment deals are based on rules of property. The rules of 
property determine in large part the economically useful aspects of assets. Formal rules of property 
enable property to be legally represented in writing (e.g. as a title, contract, security, etc.). In 
advanced property systems, these legal representations enable property to be used as collateral for a 
loan, as equity to be exchanged for an investment, as an address for collecting debts or taxes, and for 
many other purposes. Without functioning property rights, capital itself cannot be created, thus 
preventing people from pledging, leveraging (e.g. using moveable collateral, buildings or land parcels 
to secure loans), and moving their assets. Therefore many businesses, investors and property holders 
are excluded from a fundamental benefit of the market system. Housing markets, mortgages, tax 
collection, urban and national planning all cease to function efficiently when property rights do not 
function. Moreover, most market reforms cannot fully succeed where rules governing property are 
unclear or absent.  
 
 
(source: Inter-American Development Bank, “Multi-lateral Investment Fund (MIF) Cluster Action Plan” 
Nd.)
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APPENDIX V 
 
The Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center 
University of Maryland  
Website: http://www.iris.umd.edu/StaticReader.aspx/About_IRIS.htm 
 
IRIS is a research and advisory center located in the Department of Economics at the University of 
Maryland, College Park.  
 
We work to understand and facilitate economic growth and democratic development in poor and 
transition countries, focusing on the role of institutions — the formal and informal rules by which 
individuals organize economic, political, and social activity.  
 
 
Research, Implementation, Strategy 
 
In partnership with scholars, international donors, and reformers, IRIS designs and supports reform 
efforts, improves the delivery of foreign assistance, and promotes knowledge sharing. IRIS is widely 
recognized as 
 
• A pre-eminent policy research institute on institutional reform and economic development 
 
• An implementer of innovative reform projects in the field 
 
• A source of strategic thinking and insight on development issues  
 
IRIS was among the first to show that market-augmenting institutions — such as property rights 
and contract enforcement — are key to development and are more secure when they are embedded 
in democratic governance structures. Understanding how these institutions evolve and applying 
these insights to specific problems forms the work of IRIS’s home office and field teams.  
 
Knowledge Generation & Dissemination 
 
IRIS seeks to generate new knowledge and insights through all of our activities. We publish books, 
articles, working papers, and country reports, and conduct training sessions and briefings at USAID 
and other development and economic institutions around the world. Some IRIS staff also teach and 
advise in their academic departments, as faculty members of the University of Maryland. 
 
 
 
(source: The Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Research Center. (University of Maryland, Nd.)). 
Page 72 of 85 
  
   
 
APPENDIX VI 
 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
Website: http://www.lincolninst.edu/aboutlincoln/index.asp  
 
Introduction to the Lincoln Institute 
The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a nonprofit and tax-exempt educational institution founded 
in 1974 to improve the quality of public debate and decisions in the areas of land policy and land-
related taxation. The Institute's goals are to integrate theory and practice to better shape land policy 
and to provide a nonpartisan forum for discussion of the multidisciplinary forces that influence 
public policy. Inspired by the work of Henry George as expressed in the book Progress and Poverty 
(1879), the Lincoln Institute introduces his thinking and ideas into the contemporary land and tax 
policy debate to advance a more equitable and productive society. The work of the Institute is 
organized in three departments and two programs:  
• Department of Planning and Development  
• Department of Valuation and Taxation  
• Department of International Studies  
• Program on Latin America and the Caribbean  
• Program on the People's Republic of China  
 
The Institute seeks to inform decision making through education, research, dissemination of 
information, and demonstration projects in the United States and internationally. Our programs 
bring together scholars, practitioners, public officials, policy advisers, and involved citizens in a 
collegial learning community. The Institute does not take a particular point of view, but rather serves 
as a catalyst to facilitate analysis and discussion of land use and taxation issues — to make a 
difference today and to help policy makers plan for tomorrow. 
 
While most programs focus on land and tax policy in the United States, the Institute recognizes the 
effects of the global economy and urbanization on land uses, land markets, and fiscal 
decentralization. We have a special interest in Latin America and the Caribbean, where we 
have developed a collaborative network of scholars and public officials who work toward 
understanding and improving land policies in different contexts.  
 
The Institute offers two types of courses: executive courses and professional development courses. 
Executive courses, offered by invitation, present a unique opportunity for senior professionals and 
policy makers to learn with peers and colleagues in the areas of taxation, planning, and development. 
Professional development courses are available through open enrollment to practitioners, academics, 
and concerned citizens. Some courses are cosponsored with professional and academic associations, 
community-based organizations, local government agencies, and other educational institutions. In 
addition to the courses, the Institute supports many national and international conferences, 
seminars, and lectures. The Institute also has expanded the number and variety of online courses, 
publications, and educational resources. To ensure the continued development of innovative and 
professional ideas and practices, the Institute supports visiting faculty, graduate students, and 
professional fellows engaged in research on many aspects of land use and land-related taxation. It 
also publishes and disseminates the work of its fellows and faculty members.  
 
(source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Cambridge, MA: Nd)) 
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APPENDIX VII 
 
World Bank Country Study Policy Matrix 
**Policies with short-term impact *Policies with medium and long-term impact 
Key Constraints Policy Options 
 
1. The debt crisis and fiscal deterioration  
 
Revenues are already high, at 29.6 percent of GDP in 
2002/03 (tax revenues 26.4 percent of GDP). Tax 
revenues will need to increase further in order to 
make the fiscal and debt situation more sustainable.  
 
This could be achieved if the informal sector could 
be better taxed and tax rates across sectors 
rationalized. 
 
Extend tax base, rationalize taxes and reduce 
tertiary education subsidy 
 
**Reduce the disparity in tax rates across sectors. 
 
**Extend the tax base to include more of the 
informal sector by a system of presumptive taxes 
based on consumption indicators. 
 
*Levy and increase tolls on upcoming and existing 
infrastructure facilities. 
 
**Reduce subsidy on tertiary education 
 
*Build social consensus and buy-in for difficult, but 
necessary, economic policy choices. 
 
 
2. Pervasive and high crime and violence 
 
Jamaica has very high rates of violent crime, 
including the third highest homicide rate in the 
world. 
 
Crime imposes major costs on society and business, 
which limit growth (see below). 
 
The empirical foundation for action on crime is 
weak. 
 
Crime costs society at least 4 percent of GDP 
explicitly, including lost production, health expenses, 
and public and private spending. In addition, 
exporting firms’ security costs can be as high as 5 
percent of sales, small firms’ losses due to extortion, 
fraud, robbery and arson can be 9 percent of 
revenue, with an average of 3-6 percent for firms in 
manufacturing and distribution. 
 
Crime reduces the efficiency of capital use by limiting 
multi-shift operations, and of schooling because of 
closures. It results in major implicit social costs. 
 
The costs of crime limit growth. Some 10-20 percent 
of firms in the business survey suggested that they 
 
Identify and measure crime better 
 
*Strengthen official data collection on crime, and 
conduct frequent victimization surveys. These would 
be an input for policy-making, improving policing 
methods, public debate and better accountability. 
 
Improve enforcement, increase social capital, 
and target high crime areas. 
 
*Upgrade investigative capacity of police to improve 
clear-up rates for violent crime, which would deter 
such crime. 
 
*Form effective partnerships between police business 
and local communities, by setting common goals and 
sharing information. 
 
*Build social capital such as greater trust and lower 
tolerance to crime and violence, especially through 
interventions in the home, school and workplace. 
 
*Target high crime urban areas, especially the 
Kingston Metropolitan Area to reduce the impact of 
crime on the business community. 
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may close down in the next three years because of 
crime. 
 
 
4. Inadequate credit access for private sector 
 
Jamaica quickly resolved its massive financial crisis, 
and strengthened financial regulation and supervision 
but at great cost. Jamaican Government debt is now 
about 45 percent of bank deposits, about twice the 
share of private credit. With high and relatively risk-
free returns on government debt, banks have become 
more reluctant to lend to private firms, especially 
small firms and start-ups, which constrains a 
potentially vibrant source of GDP and export 
growth. In fact, with the current returns on 
government debt, even some current and potential 
entrepreneurs may become rentiers. 
 
Start credit registries and improve collateral 
procedures 
 
**Reduce the demand for resources by government, 
which means increasing the primary surplus-see 
above. This will increase availability of credit for the 
private sector, gradually reduce interest rates, and 
also improve the incentives for entrepreneurial rather 
than rentier behavior. 
 
*Accelerate the startup of credit registries to improve 
lending quality and quantity. Registries allow financial 
intermediaries to lend to borrowers more likely to 
repay and give borrowers an incentive to repay to 
maintain a good credit record. Credit registries can 
increase access by including small borrowers and 
records of loan repayments as well as defaults. 
 
*Improve collateral procedures, perhaps by creating 
debt tribunals separate from the court system, as 
other countries have done. Lenders and businessmen 
have complained about the courts’ handling of 
commercial cases. 
 
(Source: World Bank (2004), 4-6)
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